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This dissertation describes the development of an architectural modeling 
methodology that supports the Navy’s requirement to evaluate potential changes 
to gun weapon systems in order to identify potential software safety risks.  The 
modeling methodology includes a tool (Eagle6) that is based on the Monterey 
Phoenix (MP) modeling methodology, and has the capability to create and verify 
MP models, execute formal assertions via pre-defined macro commands, and a 
visualization tool that generates graphical representations of model scenarios.  
The Eagle6 toolset has two scenario generation modes, Exhaustive Search for 
model verification within scope, and Random trace generation for statistical 
estimates of nonfunctional properties, such as performance.  The dissertation 
demonstrates how the Eagle6 tool may improve the SSSTRP evaluation process 
by including a methodology to use formal assertions to test for software states 
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The U.S. Navy uses the Weapons System Explosive Safety Review Board 
(WSESRB pronounced “we-serb”) to evaluate potential changes to weaponry 
systems on naval ships.  The WSESRB has a Software System Safety Review 
Panel (SSSTRP—pronounced “sis-trip”) subcommittee that focuses on the 
software safety aspects of weapon system changes. The SSSTRP process 
evaluates potential software systems during the pre-acquisition process, and 
reports the findings to the WSESRB.  The SSSTRP community is experiencing a 
high vendor failure rate that results in delays to the acquisition process, and 
delays to equipment upgrades that lead to an improved war fighting capability.  
This dissertation is the result of researching three years of SSSTRP reports, and 
determining the causes of vendors failing the SSSTRP process.  It also includes 
recommendations for improved SSSTRP processes, and tools that accompany 
the process improvements. 
The SSSTRP process improvements within this dissertation center around 
a modeling and simulation tool named “Eagle6.”  Eagle6 is a web-based 
application that provides the SSSTRP community the ability to test the effects of 
potential weapon system architectural changes on the existing legacy system.  
Eagle6 uses formal methods to create macro queries that enable the 
nontechnical user to test both functional and nonfunctional system and software 
requirements, while generating reports that are understandable by both technical 
and nontechnical SSSTRP members.  The tool is publically available on the web 
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The objective of the research was to identify the problems associated with 
the high number of software safety failures associated with the Navy’s software 
system acquisition process.  Software Safety is defined as “The software has 
unintended (and unsafe) behavior beyond what is specified in the requirements” 
(Leveson, 1995).  This dissertation includes research on three years of 
unclassified software system safety evaluation reports and an analysis of the 
findings (Chapter II).  A prototype modeling methodology, and the ability to apply 
the modeling methodology to the software safety domain, is demonstrated in 
Chapter III.  The contributions of this research are as follows: 
 A prototype methodology and tools to support software system 
safety analysis for the Navy’s software system acquisition process 
 Higher fidelity of software system safety evaluation using tools that 
support assertion checking 
 Two methods for architecture testing using exhaustive search for 
model verification, and random scenario generation for statistical 
estimates of nonfunctional requirements, such as performance 
 Extension of Monterey Phoenix Modeling Methodology to include a 
framework that uses predefines macro queries to execute 
aggregate operations over events  
 A. PROBLEM OVERVIEW 
Chapter I contains information describing the Navy’s Weapon System 
Explosive Safety Review Board certification process for Software Systems.  
Specifically, this chapter describes the SSSTRP evaluation process, and the 
impact to naval operations of the vendor failing the SSSTRP evaluation process.  
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the process and results related to 




process.  The results of this research demonstrate that the SSSTRP evaluation 
process lacks sufficient software safety evaluation methodology and tools. 
 B. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
The United States Navy formed the Weapon System Explosives Safety 
Review Board (WSESRB) in 1968 as a result of a fire on the USS Forrestal (CV-
59) (U.S. Navy, 2007).  The subsequent investigation recommended the 
establishment of an independent review process (Naval Sea Systems Command, 
1997).  The report highlighted the need to ensure that safety requirements for 
explosives were met for all munitions introduced to the Fleet. 
The WSESRB's responsibility is to review the overall safety aspects of 
each weapon system, explosive system, and related system to ensure that 
weapon system safety requirements are in compliance.  After assessing the 
degree of compliance with existing criteria, the WSESRB provides a 
recommendation to the program manager, program sponsor, Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), and the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) on the adequacy 
of the safety program and on whether the proposed weapon system should 
advance to the next stage in the acquisition cycle.  At the discretion of the 
WSESRB Chairperson, special WSESRB Technical Review Panels (TRPs) may 
review specific safety aspects requiring special expertise (e.g., ordnance-related 
software safety) in weapon systems.  An appointed TRP Chairperson leads the 
TRP team that has at least two other members.  Naval Systems Commanders, 
upon request from the WSESRB Chairperson, may identify a member to serve 
on TRPs.  These members are subject-matter experts and have expertise in the 
applicable area of the TRP.  Other members and technical advisors, chosen for 
their expertise, are appointed at the discretion of the TRP Chairperson.  
Recommendations made by TRPs are presented to the Program Office 
and the WSESRB at the conclusion of the TRP meeting; however, the TRP 
recommendations do not become official until the WSERSRB reviews and 




recommendations of the TRP.  The results of the WSESRB action on the TRP 
recommendations are provided to the Program Office.   
Dahlgren Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center 
(NAVSURFWARCENDIV Dahlgren), Dahlgren, Virginia, acts as a principal 
activity for system safety support to the WSESRB, as well as chairing the 
ordnance-related Software Systems Safety Technical Review Panel (SSSTRP) 
and other TRPs as assigned.  The evaluation process contains: (1) developing 
and recommending, with WSESRB approval, TRP review criteria, and project 
data; (2) coordinating meetings of the SSSTRP with members and program 
offices; (3) assisting the program office in tailoring TRP review criteria for the 
type of program and the current program phase; (4) identifying qualified technical 
advisors to participate in the TRP, and, with the WSESRB chairperson’s 
concurrence, arranging for their participation; (5) scheduling meetings of the TRP 
at the request of the WSESRB chairperson; and (6) providing a summary report 






Figure 1:  WSESRB Structure (From NAVSEAINST 8020.6D) 
Figure 1 represents the WSESRB certification process (Naval Sea 
Systems Command, 1997).  The WSESRB’s responsibility is to review safety 
aspects of each weapon system in order to ensure the Navy's safety 
requirements are met.  The software engineering processes are not directly 
addressed within this certification process; instead, software engineering 
processes are handled through the SSSTRP, a subcommittee that addresses 
software development processes and outputs in order to ensure software safety.  
The software vendor responds to the SSSTRP’s Request for Proposal (RFP) with 
a predefined Technical Data Package (TDP).  The TDP requirements structure 





1. Problem Statement 
A gunship system has both hardware and software components.  
Unacceptable unintended behavior of the software system may result from 
defective architectural changes made to the hardware and/or software 
components of the gunship system.  The defective architectural changes can 
result from an incorrect implementation of well-designed software system 
architectural plans and/or the correct implementation of a software system 
architectural design that does not meet the gun weapon system requirements.   
The Navy’s Software System Safety Technical Review Panel (SSSTRP), a 
committee of domain experts, is responsible for evaluating the gun weapon 
system architectural designs, but its evaluation methodology does not contain 
adequate structure for evaluating potential gunship architectural changes and/or 
the software tools necessary to test the proposed gun weapon system 
architectural changes.   Consequently, the SSTRP committee would unwittingly 
approve of defective software system architectural changes that can result in 
unacceptable unintended software behavior, which, in turn, can lead to potential 
software safety risks.  These potential software safety issues, if unidentified 
during the SSSTRP evaluation process, can eventually derail the gunship system 
acquisition.  To identify potential software safety issues that may bring such 
demise to the gunship system acquisition, it is necessary to achieve these two 
goals: (1) Identify areas within the SSSTRP evaluation process that need 
improved and (2) predict the unintended behavior of the gunship software.  A 
research effort is thus needed to enable attainment of the two goals.  It consists 
of an investigation of the SSSTRP evaluation process and the development of a 
software tool that has the ability to model potential gunship software system 
architectural change.  The investigation of the process will result in 
recommendations for improving the SSSTRP evaluation process.  The software 
tool will aid the SSSTRP personnel in the evaluation of potential software system 




1. SSSTRP Mission 
The SSSTRP's primary focus is to investigate the vendor's software 
engineering processes, and to identify any risks associated with the 
implementation of the product.  Vendors submit Technical Data Packages 
(TDPs) that contain supporting documentation from the vendor’s software 
engineering quality assurance program.  The vendor's responsibility during the 
SSSTRP presentation is to explain the known risks of its product, and the risk 
mitigation strategies for each known risk.  
The design of the SSSTRP review process entails assignments of both 
functional and subject matter experts (FME/SME) as members of a technical 
review board.  The TDP is comprised of software development life cycle 
documentation that was generated during the vendor's product development 
process.  
Our research shows that the current SSSTRP process has a failure rate of 
over 80% (Rivera & Luqi, 2010), resulting in (1) the government program office 
placing the project on hold until the vendor responds to the failures; or (2) the 
government acquisition community having to find an alternative vendor solution 
that has the functional and technical capability to pass the SSSTRP process. 
A vendor’s failure in the SSSTRP process may impact both the end-user 
and the acquisition community in the following ways: 
 Project timelines are at risk, thereby resulting in higher failure rates 
for related project milestones. 
 The end-user ability to leverage the new product 
functionality/capability is delayed. 
 The end-user may be forced to use a product that has lesser 
functionality overlap, or multiple products to meet the total 
functional requirement. 





The unacceptable risks associated with the high level of SSSTRP failures 
are due to a SSSTRP evaluation process that has no clear definition of software 
analysis, and no identification of a standardized evaluation process.  The 
purpose of this research is to explore the problems of the naval gun weapon 
system SSSTRP evaluation process, and propose a methodology for identifying 
software safety risks.  Specifically, our research investigates how to reduce the 
impact of the vendor failing the SSSTRP process, and how to standardize the 
software safety quality assurance requirements using a formal method of 
evaluating potential software.   
2. Research Approach 
The primary goal of this research project is to identify SSSTRP evaluation 
process improvements, and provide a methodology and tools that support a 
software safety assessment with higher fidelity.  Figure 2 represents the 
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determine if failures are related to a 









The research plan includes the following areas of focus: 
 Analyze SSSTRP Reports – The purpose of the analysis phase is 
to identify the primary reasons for SSSTRP failures within a data 
set that contains 2007-2009 unclassified U.S. Navy SSSTRP 
reports.   
 SSSTRP Structure – The research plan includes a requirement to 
analyze SSSTRP personnel structure, and the impact of the 
SSSTRP personnel structure relative to vendor failure rates. 
 Identify Modeling Methodologies – Recommendations for 
improvements to the SSSTRP process may require an integration 
of a modeling methodology that supports a streamlined acquisition 
process, and ensures a high-level of fidelity relative to software 
safety evaluation techniques. 
The research goals are used as a means of determining the course of the 
research.  The goals have also been established based on the literature review, 
which identifies potential gaps in the current Navy software acquisition process.   
The research for this dissertation required us to submit a request to the 
U.S. Navy to view the previous three years of naval gun weapon system 
SSSTRP findings (2007–2009).  The Navy Program Office PEO IWS 3C, Naval 
Gunnery Project Office approved our request to release SSSTRP results that 
were not classified as sensitive, and provided a subset of three years of SSSTRP 
findings.  The SSSTRP findings contain opinions, reports, and recommendations 
to the WSESRB.  Issues identified in the SSSTRP are documented in the final 
report (Rivera & Luqi, Requirements Framework for the Software System Safety 
Technical Review Panel Technical Review Package, 2010).   
The SSSTRP reports were analyzed in order to determine potential 
commonalities for vendor failures.  The SSSTRP failures were categorized using 
SSSTRP failure category definitions that were obtained from the WESESRB 




a. Project Planning 
The Software Development Project Plan defines the dates, 
milestones, and deliverables that drive the project’s milestone and timeline 
definitions. The following documents are software engineering project 
management deliverables that fall within the “Project Planning” category: 
Project Charter – The Project Charter describes the agreement 
between the organization providing the product or service, and the client 
organization requesting and receiving the project deliverable. It is a tool to obtain 
commitment from all affected groups and individuals within a specific project. It is 
an agreement between the technical and business groups which define: 
 Partners and external stakeholders 
 The project management framework 
 Roles, responsibilities, accountabilities, and activities of the 
team members  
 Management commitments 
 The authorized project accountability framework 
Project Management Plan (PMP) – The PMP is the controlling 
document to manage an Information Management/Information Technology 
(IM/IT) project. Upon approval, the PMP provides a baseline to monitor progress 
and measure results.  The PMP contains the following structure: 
 Purpose, scope, and interim and final deliverables of the 
project  
 Schedule and budget for the project  
 Project assumptions and constraints  
 Managerial and technical processes necessary to develop 





 Resource requirements  
 Additional project plan requirements 
Scope Statement – The Scope Statement is a summary-level 
description of a project that includes project justification, project purpose and 
scope, and high-level work plan and deliverables, in addition to product/service 
description. 
Quality Management Plan(QMP) – The QMP describes the 
requirement to ensure the products/deliverables are correct (i.e., function 
correctly, satisfy specifications) and to ensure that the project's project 
management and development processes are applied properly so as to ensure 
the quality of the products. 
The Quality Management Plan identifies the standards, practices, 
and methods to be used in the project for performing quality assurance activities. 
It also explains the verification process for deliverables, the tracking and 
reporting of items that do not conform to the QMP, the process to approve 
deliverables, and the process for Technical Reviews and Verification and 
Validation Audits. 
Test Plan – The Test Plan is used to organize, schedule, and 
manage the testing effort. The test plan defines the types of testing (e.g. 
functional, performance, usability) and the test levels (e.g., unit, integration, field 
testing) within the planning and implementation phases of the project. 
The Test Plan identifies test items, testing tasks and 
responsibilities, the testing environment, testing resource requirements, and the 
schedule of the testing activities. It also lists the individual tests, and the 
objective, procedures, and expected results of each test. 
Risk Management Plan – The Risk Management Plan describes 
the management of project risk, and is a subset or companion element of the 
Project Management Plan.  It identifies the involvement of the project team, the 




scheduling of each major risk management activity (e.g., identification, analysis, 
prioritization, monitoring), risks threshold criteria, and reporting formats. 
Performance Plan – The Performance Plan specifies the project 
parameters (e.g., cost, schedule, risks) and the product/service attributes (size, 
complexity, sites) that will be used to analyze and report the current status of the 
project, and to forecast future progress and status. It is a subset or companion 
piece to the Project Management Plan. 
The Performance Plan outlines what raw data will be collected, the 
performance requirements analysis plan, the performance testing tools, and 
types and frequency of performance reports. 
HR (Staffing and Training) Management Plan – The HR 
Management Plan defines the rotation schedule for project resources, and the 
evaluation of performance.  In addition, it identifies the training requirements to 
ensure the project team posses the requisite knowledge and skill set. 
Configuration Management Plan (CMP) – The CMP describes 
the set of activities and tools to ensure that the project has adequate control over 
all items necessary for creating or supporting the project deliverables.  The CMP 
defines the project deliverables in which it has control, and the mechanism for 
controlling changes to those items. It also describes how baselines are produced, 
the configuration reporting requirements, and the audits or reviews of the 
configuration management process. 
Procurement Management Plan – The Procurement Management 
Plan documents the management process of identifying how project needs may 
best be met by procuring products and/or services, such as: 
 Hardware (e.g., development and/or installation hardware) 
 Software (e.g., COTS, outsourcing some or all of the 
development)   





The Procurement Management Plan identifies procurement 
strategies, outlines the scope of products and/or services to be procured, and 
identifies responsibilities for the procurement process up to and including 
contract closeout. 
Requirements Management Plan (RMP) – The RMP describes 
the management of the project’s requirements for products and services during 
the project life cycle.  It describes the steps to develop an understanding of the 
provider’s requirements with specific focus on requirements definition and 
measurements.  The RMP also identifies and controls changes to requirements 
as they evolve during the project to ensure traceability. 
Software Development Plan (SDP) – The SDP details the 
activities and deliverables during the Software Development Life Cycle of a 
project.  The SDP defines the software development methodology, the design, 
programming and documentation standards, the establishment, control, and 
maintenance of the development environment, and any other applicable software 
development activities. 
Information Management Plan – The Information Management 
Plan details the communication and integration activities required to successfully 
incorporate the new functionality in the enterprise, to include ensuring the new 
product is in accordance with existing legislation, regulations, and policies. 
The Information Management Plan describes the identification of 
client information needs, and the information standards.  In addition, the 
Information Management Plan describes how access to information, privacy, 
confidentiality, security, intellectual property provisions, retention requirements, 
and other life cycle management of information considerations are taken into 
account within the project life cycle. 
Requirements Specification – The Requirements Specification 
defines the boundaries for the project and explicitly specifies system/product 
requirements and features. The Requirements Specification stipulates functional, 




maintenance, interface, qualification requirements, and the definition of 
acceptance criteria.    The Requirements Specifications provides a documented 
reference of the project team's understanding of the product/system 
requirements, and the deliverables required to provide the product/system. 
Risk Log - The Risk log is a listing by ranking of the project risks 
and related risk information.  The Risk Log provides a statement of each risk, its 
ranking, the probability of occurrence and impact if the risk occurs, the planned 
response, the person responsible for mitigation actions, and the current status 
and actions. 
Change Requests - Changes occur during the project life cycle 
due to the addition or change to the requirements of the project's products or 
services, to an increase or decrease in the complexity of project activities, to an 
under or over cost or time estimate, or due to changes in the project assumptions 
or dependencies.  A Change Request identifies the need to expand or contract 
the project scope, modify costs or adjust schedule estimates. It describes in a 
concise manner the reason, scope, and impact of a change, and records the 
approval to proceed with the change. 
Closure Plan - A Closure Plan summarizes the results of a project 
and the activities required for the transition of the project's products and services 
from "development" to "production" state.  The Closure Report identifies the 
extent to which the project objectives were satisfied and the anticipated benefits 
realized, the person or group within the client's organization who will oversee the 
transition to the "production" state, the lessons learned during the project, the list 
of project files, and the support arrangements and warranty period, rules and 
conditions. 
Project Acceptance Plan – The Project Acceptance Plan 
formalizes client acceptance of all the deliverables of a project (or a phase) and 
also confirms that there are no outstanding deliverables. 
Deployment and Maintenance Plan – The Deployment and 




This concept sets the overall parameters for change management during the 
maintenance phase.  Version control, upgrade planning, and legacy support are 
parts of the Deployment and Maintenance Plan. 
b. System Safety Program 
The System Safety Program optimizes system safety in the design, 
development, use, and maintenance of software systems and their integration 
with safety critical hardware systems in an operational environment. 
Software Safety Program – The Software Safety Program 
identifies all potential risks associated with a software installation, usage, 
interface requirements, hardware/software sharing, software maintenance, and 
system retirement.  The Software Safety Program identifies critical risk scenarios 
that affect the software’s ability to function not as designed, or to mitigate 
functional design risks. 
Safety Risk Management - Safety Risk Management is an 
iterative process that begins with an initial safety assessment of all known 
hazards.  Known hazard states are stored in a Hazard Tracking System (HTS) in 
order to document the mitigation associated with each hazard. Safety precepts 
are incorporated during system development to reduce the likelihood of the 
hazards from occurring.  Safety Risk Management concludes when the residual 
risks have been reduced to a level acceptable to the appropriate authority. 
Safety Verification/Audits - Safety Verification and Audit efforts 
are performed to ensure safety data is being collected and objectives and 
requirements of the safety program are being met. Test plans, test procedures, 
and results of all tests including design verification, operational evaluation, 
technical data validation and verification are reviewed to ensure the safety of the 
design is adequately demonstrated and that the results of the safety evaluations 
are included in the appropriate test and evaluation reports. Audits are scheduled 
at major program milestones so as to provide management with an indicator of 




Hazard Tracking Management – The purpose of Hazard Tracking 
Management is to identify safety critical issues, evaluate hazards, and 
document/manage the mitigation efforts required to minimize the impact of the 
hazard.  Tracking systems are part of the risk mitigation strategy and are an 
ongoing effort to stabilize the safety of control-based software. 
Based on the software test data, (including mishap data from 
similar systems and other lessons learned), hazards associated with the 
proposed design or function are evaluated for hazard severity, hazard probability, 
and operational constraints. As a minimum, the Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
considers the following for identification and evaluation of hazards:  
 Hazardous components (e.g., fuels, lasers, toxic substances, 
munitions).  
 Safety design criteria to control safety-critical software 
commands and responses (e.g., inadvertent command, 
failure to command, untimely command or responses) must 
be identified and appropriate action taken to incorporate 
them into the software specifications.  
 Environmental constraints including the operating 
environments (e.g., temperatures, fire, lightning, and 
radiation).  
 Safety related equipment, safeguards, and possible alternate 
approaches. 
 Identification of the safety requirements, standards and other 
regulations pertaining to personnel safety, environmental 
hazards, and toxic substances with which the system will 
have to comply. 
COTS/GOTS/NDI Assessment - In an Open Architecture 
environment, the COTS/GOTS/NDI assessment is centered on the exposure 




The interfaces between the COTS/GOTS/NDI software and the Open 
Architecture environment are thoroughly analyzed to ensure there are no 
impeding conflicts.  The ongoing management and/or maintenance of 
COTS/GOTS/NDI software is also monitored to ensure version control is well-
documented and analyzed in order to ensure the vendor has not made changes 
that may impact the safety assessments. 
Simulation/Stimulation/Emulation - Simulation-Stimulation-
Emulation test documentation is evaluated to ensure proper stress, boundary, 
and environmental testing meets the minimum software system safety 
requirements for Open Architecture integration. 
C. RESEARCH FINDINGS: SSSTRP REPORT ANALYSIS 
The process of reviewing three years of SSSTRP reports was designed to 
identify potential gaps in the current software acquisition SSSTRP evaluation 
process, and to identify trends in TRP vendor failures.  A failure is defined as any 
SSSTRP report that resulted in the software acquisition process being 
temporarily or permanently halted as a result of the SSSTRP review.  This 
section covers the methods used to gather, classify, and report the SSSTRP 
failures. 
A total of 86 SSSTRP reports were identified within the 2007, 2008, and 
2009 fiscal years.  Table 1 provides a summary of the resulting issues within 
these reports.  It should be noted that although the total number of issue reports 
was 86, there are 177 total issues reported within these issue reports; this is due 
to multiple SSSTRP reports containing multiple failures within multiple 
categories.  With a mean of 2.06 failures per SSSTRP failure report, the 
maximum number of failures found was four and the lowest number of failures 
being one.  SSSTRP failure reports are not issued in cases where there is no 












Software Safety Program 34 19.2 39.5 
System Safety Program 27 15.3 31.5 
Safety Verification/Audits 24 13.6 27.9 
Product Integration and Test 19 10.7 22.1 
Project Planning 18 10.2 21.0 
Safety Risk Management 12 6.8 14.0 
Validation & Verification 9 5.1 10.5 
Risk Management 9 5.1 10.5 
Configuration Management 6 3.4 7.0 
COTS/GOTS/NDI 6 3.4 7.0 
Hazard 
Tracking Management 5 2.3 5.8 
Sim-Stim-Emulation 4 2.3 4.7 
Requirements Management 2 1.1 2.3 
Deployment & Maintenance 2 1.1 2.3 
Table 1: Ungrouped SSSTRP Failure Results 
The figures in Table1 indicate ungrouped failures for all potential failure 
modes identified within the 86 cases that were analyzed.  The results show that 
the majority of SSSTRP failures were found within the more complex areas of 
project management and system and software safety management.  Table 2 
indicates the number of failures found within these areas (as well as those that 
belong to other stages, such as maintenance/implementation). 
 
Stage (grouped Categories) # Issues 
Percentage of 
all Failures 
Software and System Safety and Risk 
Management 111 62.7 
Project Management (Implementation) 58 32.8 
Life Cycle (Post implementation) 8 4.5 
Total 177  




Table 2 shows that approximately 63% of all reports occurred within the 
system and software safety and risk management areas, which include Software 
Safety Program, System Safety Program, Safety Verification/Audits, Safety Risk 
Management, Risk Management, and Hazard Tracking Management.  The 
second most common area of problems reported was in the Project 
Management/Implementation category, which included errors in the Product 
Integration and Test, Project Planning, Validation and Verification, 
COTS/GOTS/NDI, Simulation-Stimulation-Emulation, and Requirements 
Management phases of the vendor implementation plans.  Approximately 5% of 
final failures occurred post-implementation in the project life cycle; these failures 
fell within the Configuration Management, and Deployment and Maintenance 
phases.  
The conclusive evidence within the research shows the majority of 
weaknesses within the SSSTRP process for Navy software acquisition occurs 
within the system and software safety areas.  These findings are also consistent 
with previous research in the area, which found that safe software acquisition 
was increasingly complex and was a consistently problematic area in Naval 
acquisition processes (Rivera & Luqi, 2010). 
D. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
The SSSTRP reports that were made available by the U.S. Navy included 
only declassified results.  The representative nature of these reports was 
impossible to determine with certainty because we did not have access to the full 
set of the data, which included classified SSSTRP reports.  However, because 
the structure of the SSSTRP evaluation process is not affected by the 
classification level of the data, there is no reason to believe that the unclassified 
data used for this research is not representative of the domain. 
As the reports were provided over a period of three years, it was expected 
that there would be variations in format and textual content.  However, the 
structure of the reports varied and the reports did not display a consistent 




general headings that could be used for guidance, the data contained in the 
reports was opinionated justification for recommendations, and did not follow a 
standardized evaluation and reporting format.  Over the three years of report 
data, there were few instructions for how a SSSTRP member should report a 
finding, and what information was required for a failure report.   
This lack of evaluation and reporting structure resulted in SSSTRP 
evaluation reports that were largely the result of human inspection, which led to a 
SSSTRP member’s personal opinions about a potential failure.  Thus, the 
inconsistency and weakness in internal structure of these reports made them 
impossible to categorize/analyze beyond the classifications found in this 
dissertation.  Additionally, a large number of issues resulting in a SSSTRP failure 
were present in one or more milestone phases.  Since the evaluation milestones 
are sequential, this was highly problematic because issues that were found in 
earlier stages were problematic for future milestone requirements.  "Repeating 
Incidents" was widespread and persistent, and was identified across multiple 
project milestones.   
Related to the SSSTRP evaluation process is a human resources issue 
that was identified during the examination of the reports.  Our research found a 
very high turnover on the SSSTRP committee, with few long-term members.  
Additionally, the SSSTRP committee did not always consist of software or 
process experts, but included members from other areas of expertise.  The 
committee members, in addition to rotating frequently, also did not have 
standardized evaluation documents available in order to ease the process of 
failure determination; instead, each failure was identified, analyzed, and 
processed individually.   
1.  Vendor Self-Assessment 
The SSSTRP reports did not demonstrate any evidence of self- of the 
software systems submitted by vendors.  The research showed a lack of readily 
available standards for this self-assessment, preventing software vendors from 




SSSTRP.  Requirements documents were available that identified the functional 
requirements of the software; however, these documents did not identify the 
safety requirements and risk assessment processes used for the software.  
Additionally, as the SSSTRP committee does not have a guideline for the 
analysis of the safety requirements or other requirements of the submissions, it is 
difficult for vendors to determine what will (or will not) pass the screening 
process.  Because of this ambiguous evaluation process, it is exceptionally 
difficult for a vendor to determine potential areas of TRP improvement that could 
increase the vendor’s chances of passing the SSSTRP evaluation process.  By 
extending the TRP to include a vendor self-assessment, it would be possible to 
improve the overall outcomes of the process and increase the chances for the 
products to pass the SSSTRP assessment.   
2.  Research Results Summary 
The analysis of the SSSTRP reports resulted in the following summary: 
 The SSSTRP is unable to sufficiently test potential naval gun 
weapon system software solutions during the acquisition process. 
 The Vendor Technical Data Package (TDP) requirements and 
evaluation methodology is not structured in such a way that 
supports a high fidelity evaluation of software safety. 
The main recommendation that may be derived from this analysis is that 
the SSSTRP review process may be improved with the introduction of a 
methodology that can be used by both the SSSTRP members and software 
vendors to evaluate software safety.  Providing the SSSTRP community with 
high-level models that may satisfy a portion of the software safety assessment 
process improves the current inspection-based evaluation methodology.  Without 
a high-level modeling process, the alternative is to implement the system and to 
perform testing.  Manual testing is a very expensive and timely alternative, which 
may be partially satisfied using the prototype methodology and tools that are 




 Short Feedback Cycles - Automating system/business processes 
start with process design. The creative process of redesign requires 
iterations of your ideas.  The modeling timeline should be as short 
as possible to align the results of each step with its input. MP 
satisfies this requirement in short order as there are only seven 
total constructs required to model in MP.   
 Involving Domain Experts in Model Development - Because MP is 
easy to learn, teaching domain experts how to model in MP is 
critical to shortening the SSSTRP evaluation process.  Closing the 
knowledge transfer gap between business and IT may result in 
models that require less testing and include lower levels of 
refinement.  Our modeling methodology suggests domain experts 
are part of the model development team.  As identified in my 
dissertation (Prototype SSSTRP Evaluation Process), the domain 
experts do not create all models on their own, but they are a part of 
the team with technical people. 





II. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature review discusses the current state of methodology and tools 
within software safety domain, with specific focus on enterprise systems.  This 
review contains information about the COTS integration risks, vendor selection, 
software acquisition, software architecture, the Navy’s Open Architecture 
Enterprise Program, abstract modeling methodologies, and software safety 
standards and frameworks.  The goal of this chapter is to review the current state 
of technology in order to determine if a potential solution exists that may reduce 
the vendor failure rates within the SSSTRP process. 
The Navy’s SSSTRP process has been using both commercial off-the-
shelf systems (COTS) and open architecture (OA) approaches to satisfy the 
software requirements for new and emerging technologies associated with naval 
weaponry.  The acquisition process of COTS-based software exposes an 
organization to the potential for operation failure due to discontinued support of 
the product; acquisition or dissolution of the vendor; or aging software becoming 
less compatible with newer software that has related functions.  However, the 
risk profiles of (COTS) software and customized software vary and may provide 
different advantages and disadvantages to the implementation of new systems.  
In an attempt to evaluate the effects of both COTS and OA approaches to naval 
weaponry software safety requirements, the literature review chapter covers both 
COTS-based solutions and custom development. 
B. SOFTWARE SAFETY RISKS WHEN EVALUATING A COTS 
SOLUTION 
COTS software is a popular software choice for organizations that want to 
acquire and implement software quickly and easily.  However, lack of control 
over the software configuration or lack of ability to customize the software may 





the customer unduly dependent on the vendor.  Chapter II.B. discusses the 
software safety risk assessment process for COTS, as well as the particular risks 
associated with COTS software acquisition. 
C. GUN WEAPON SYSTEM SOFTWARE SAFETY RISK: SOFTWARE 
OBSOLESCENCE 
One of the major software safety risks of COTS is obsolescence (Merola, 
2006).   Merola defined software obsolescence as follows: “Software applications 
become obsolete when they are retired from use and taken off the market due to 
technology advancements, decrease in product popularity, or other market 
factors.”  Merola studied the issue of software obsolescence in military 
applications, where systems development moves slowly enough that software is 
often considered to be obsolete in civilian systems before it even makes it into 
military systems.  While most civilian development does not move as slowly as 
military development, the problem also plagues the civilian market.  Merola 
described software obsolescence risk in the systems design, integration, 
production, and program management environments rather than in the 
operational environment.  Merola remarked that the specific risk in software 
obsolescence was, “the inability to maintain an infrastructure to properly integrate 
the systems, develop, maintain, or troubleshoot hardware or software code.”  
Merola distinguished between logistical, technical, and functional obsolescence 
as well.  Logistical obsolescence is the point at which system support, new 
licenses, or expansions are no longer available from the vendor (Merola, 2006).  
Functional obsolescence occurs when the software no longer functions as 
required or cannot be modified to perform required tasks, and technical 
obsolescence occurs when technical specifications of the system have been 
overtaken by technical advances (Merola, 2006).  Thus, a system may remain 
functionally useful even after it has become technically obsolete, and it may 
remain technically and functionally useful even after its logistical obsolescence.   
Merola provided a number of recommendations for avoiding software 




first of these recommendations was to include an analysis of potential 
obsolescence in the market analysis research typically performed during the 
software acquisition process (Merola, 2006).  The market analysis is performed 
to determine relative software quality, cost, and other features of the software.  
Although software vendors are not typically willing to reveal their software 
obsolescence plans, an examination of the vendor’s historical patterns of 
software obsolescence and their software renewal cycle may provide insight into 
the likelihood of obsolescence in the product being chosen (Merola, 2006).  The 
market analysis should include not only the vendor’s obsolescence planning, but 
also an investigation of the current state of the technologies in use and how they 
may engender technical obsolescence in the near future (Merola, 2006).  
Although the market analysis cannot prevent all potential risk from software 
obsolescence, it may help an organization avoid implementation of a system with 
potentially obsolete COTS components, as well as giving a potential timeframe 
for the obsolescence of the component in use (Merola, 2006).   
Leveson argued that the key to understanding safety lies in the 
understanding that no one component failure or no human error ever occurs in 
isolation - an accident is a result of some systemic problem (Leveson, 1995).  
Leveson argues that more than ever, software engineers/architects/managers 
must understand the responsibilities of software safety and develop the skills 
needed to anticipate and prevent accidents before they occur.  Professionals 
should not require a catastrophe to happen before taking action.  Leveson 
examines the following software safety fundamentals:  
 Demonstrate the importance of integrating software safety efforts 
with system safety engineering 
 Describe models of accidents and human error that underlie 
particular approaches to safety problems 
 Present the elements of a software program, including 
management, hazard analysis, requirements analysis, design for 




Software allows unprecedented levels of complexity and new failure 
modes that are starting to overwhelm the standard approaches to ensuring 
safety. Software obsolescence in naval gun weapon systems carries an inherent 
risk that requires continual software safety assessments, with specific focus on 
how the software acquisition process may affect legacy systems.  
D. VENDOR SELECTION SOFTWARE SAFETY RISKS 
The choice of vendor for the provision of gun weapon system changes 
carries with it a number of risks that may affect the SSSTRP evaluation process.  
These risks include product availability, schedule slippage, vaporware, 
modifications to the product that disrupt system compatibility or design, inter-
component compatibility, and lack of continued support (Rehman, Yang, Dong, & 
Ghafoor, 2005).  As in obsolescence and requirement mismatches, a market 
survey before the choice of a COTS vendor will mitigate the potential for vendor-
based risk, but there is no way to eliminate the risk due to changes in software 
components, something that all software undergoes as new vulnerabilities and 
bugs are exposed (Rehman, Yang, Dong, & Ghafoor, 2005).  Therefore, a 
decision-making framework is needed to help minimize the risk from vendor 
changes and unreliability that may help in avoiding some of the more common 
risks, such as schedule slippage and vaporware (Rehman, Yang, Dong, & 
Ghafoor, 2005). 
E. REQUIREMENTS AND COTS CAPABILITY MISMATCHES: A 
SOFTWARE SAFETY RISK 
A potential SSSTRP evaluation risk is the mismatch between systems 
requirements and COTS capabilities.  “Such mismatches are inevitable as COTS 
products are made for broad use while system requirements are specific to their 
context,” (Mohamed, Ruhe, & Eberlein, 2007).  The issue of COTS capability 
mismatch is particularly relevant to naval gun weapon systems as a significant 
risk may be posed for successful product integration into an existing system.  If 
the degree of mismatch is too great between the system requirements and the 




“glueware” and other customized changes to the system may result in 
unidentified software safety risks, or the system could simply be made unsuitable 
for the use to which it will be put (Mohamed, Ruhe, & Eberlein, 2007).  
The use of formal decision support systems, rather than an ad hoc 
approach has been recommended (Mohamed, Ruhe, & Eberlein, 2007) to 
resolve these requirements/capabilities mismatches.  Also recommended is the 
use of a formal method to determine if the mismatches can be resolved and, if 
so, the most efficient choice of resolution methods (Mohamed, Ruhe, & Eberlein, 
2007).  A decision support framework, called Mismatch Handling for COTS 
Selection (MiHOS), is provided as a means of comparing the cost, effort, and risk 
of resolution actions for requirements/capabilities mismatches in COTS-based 
software implementations (Mohamed, Ruhe, & Eberlein, 2007). 
F. SOFTWARE ACQUISITION EVALUATION: PERFORMANCE AND 
RELIABILITY 
In a naval gun weapon system, software performance and reliability are 
high-priority requirements when evaluating a potential software solution.  The 
development of nonfunctional requirements, including performance aspects, 
software quality, speed of execution, and other quality of service factors was a 
latecomer to the component-based architecture paradigm (Bertolino & Mirandola, 
2004).  Initially, component-based architecture was concerned only with 
functional specifications—the way in which the component could be used and the 
component’s functional purpose.  In order to ensure performance of component-
based systems, care must be taken in the architectural specification and 
development of the system, and as much information as possible about the 
components must be gained (Bertolino & Mirandola, 2004).  However, this 
approach may not be sufficient because component-based architecture is often 
relying on different systems that may not be fully compatible with each other.  
This may slow development or reduce the performance of the system.   
Reliability is another software safety consideration that may affect the 




specifying software architectures explicitly is the use of high level structural 
design information for improved control and prediction of software system quality 
attributes” (Reussner, Schmidt, & Poernomo, 2003).  However, with component-
based architecture, in some cases the specifics of the individual components 
(particularly nonfunctional characteristics such as component reliability) may not 
be known explicitly and must be determined either during the implementation of 
the system or, less ideally, after the system has entered use.  Some specific 
attributes that may not be known about the component include the usage profile 
and the required context (Reussner, Schmidt, & Poernomo, 2003).  The usage 
profile of a software component includes how often it is used as well as under 
what circumstances; thus, a software component that is used infrequently may 
not be as well understood as those that are used frequently.  The required 
context includes the other components within the system, as well as external 
components like middleware, operating systems, and network services, any of 
which may prove to be unreliable.   
These parameters were used to create a predictive model of software 
reliability that took into account not only the component reliability, but also the 
potential interface with external components (Reussner, Schmidt, & Poernomo, 
2003).   
Tamura et al. provided a similar model which uses a stochastic approach 
to software reliability (Tamura, Yamada, & Kimura, 2006).  These authors 
specifically recommend including the integration and testing stages of 
development in the main software development phase, in order to head off any 
difficulties observed with the component’s reliability during the design stage 
(Tamura, Yamada, & Kimura, 2006).  Although these models are highly technical, 
they can be used by component-based system architects to detect issues with 
component reliability and circumvent them by either redesigning the system 
dependencies or choosing a more reliable component.  A more user-friendly 
modeling methodology that allows the nontechnical stakeholder to visualize the 
potential software safety scenario is needed.  Additionally, integration of the 




evaluation process due to their level of complexity, the time requirements for 
development, and the inability of the stakeholder to understand the results. 
G. SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE MODELS AND CONSTRAINTS 
UML (Unified Modeling Language) is commonly used to design and 
analyze component-based systems (Booch, Jacobson, & Rumbaugh, 2000) 
(Coronato, d'Acierno, & De Pietro, 2005), and is the current tool of choice when 
modeling naval gun weapon systems.  Specifically, D.Harel’s state charts are 
commonly used when modeling system states (Booch, Jacobson, & Rumbaugh, 
2000). The major problem with state charts is that the process of creating a 
formal relationship between the system and the state chart is extremely difficult 
and highly complex, and thereby too time consuming to be practical for the navy 
gun weapon system acquisition process. 
These modeling practices are meant not only to provide a blueprint for the 
system design, but also to test the system’s fidelity to requirements and design 
specifications following implementation.  Coronato et al. (2005) remarked that:  
By defining the fidelity of the model as the measure of the 
correspondence between the model and the final system, it can be 
stated that UML enables designers to produce low fidelity models to 
capture high-level system characteristics in the early design phase, 
as well as high-fidelity models to specify low-level system details in 
the late design phase. (Coronato, d'Acierno, & De Pietro, 2005) 
Other significant advantages of using the UML modeling specification are 
that it creates a standard representation for use between development teams, 
such as development efforts between a potential vendor and the organization 
contracting the development.  One problem with the use of UML, however, is that 
there is no way to represent design constraints upon the system, particularly 
during translation to another language for implementations, such as IDL 
(Implementation Definition Language) (Auguston, Program behavior model 
based on event grammar and its application for debugging automation, 1995).  
According to these authors, “Design by Contract” is the practice of contracting a 




by Contract” practice is dependent on the availability of constraints in order to 
enforce the design practices required within the system (Auguston, Program 
behavior model based on event grammar and its application for debugging 
automation, 1995).   
Constraints, which are derived from high-level business requirements or 
business rules, provide the explicit requirements definition for the software 
system design.  Constraints can be difficult to manage between software 
components, especially in cases where the components do not have a consistent 
way in which they handle the constraint processing.  A modeling language that 
would allow for the definition of constraints in a way in which they can be passed 
from component to component is described as Constraint Description Language 
(CDL) (Coronato, d'Acierno, & De Pietro, 2005).  The CDL language was derived 
from standard OCL and was adapted to component architecture.  It is noted that 
ignoring the problem of constraints was not possible if the end result of the effort 
was to be a coherent software system; however, there was no readily available 
way in which to transfer constraints between different components (Auguston, 
Program behavior model based on event grammar and its application for 
debugging automation, 1995).  The lack of consistent treatment of constraints 
between components represents a significant weakness in component-based 
architecture.  As the authors noted, the issue of managing shared constraints is 
not a difficulty that cannot be overcome; however, it should remain a 
consideration in development of a component-based software system (Auguston, 
Program behavior model based on event grammar and its application for 
debugging automation, 1995). 
The development of languages specific to component-based systems 
architecture and design has been heavily researched over the last ten years, with 
new architectural languages, such as AAL, being the byproduct (Booch, 
Jacobson, & Rumbaugh, 2000).  Component-oriented programming that 
implements the systems is a recent development in software engineering.  
Fabresse et al. described a conceptual language for component-based 




SCL (Simple Content Language), described only the basic and essential 
elements of a component-based design language, as derived from a large 
number of existing component-based programming languages, like ComponentJ, 
ArchJava, Julia/Fractal, Lagoona, and Piccola (Fabresse, Dony, & Huchard, 
2008).  It is noted that the impetus for component-based design has recently 
shifted from software reuse at design to reduction of evolution costs by design for 
software reuse (Fabresse, Dony, & Huchard, 2008); thus, it is necessary to have 
customized ways in which to provide the integration or “glue” that allows 
components to be combined into a cohesive system.  
Combining systems via “glue” has an inherent requirement to evaluate a 
potential addition to an existing architecture.  Auguston (2009) suggests an 
approach to formal software system architecture specification based on behavior 
models, (Auguston, Software architecture built from behavior models, 2009).  
Monterey Phoenix (MP) (Auguston, Monterey Phoenix, or How to Make Software 
Executable, 2009) is a methodology that defines the relationship between system 
interaction and the environment.  The MP methodology includes the use of event 
grammar that generates event traces using ordered logic.  The MP framework 
provides the ability to formally evaluate software architecture using assertions.  
Auguston showed how MP contains the ability to check Assertions.  MP is 
particularly applicable to the naval gun weapon system software safety domain 
because it (1) is easily understandable by the nontechnical user; (2) supports 
reuse as the models are designed at the abstract level with no requirement to 
provide software details; (3) formalizes the evaluation of potential naval gun 
weapon system software solutions by creating assertions of unsafe software 
safety states and testing for counter examples of assertions; and (4) can output 
visual representations of scenarios in formats that are easily understood 
(Auguston, Michael, & Shing, Environment behavior models for automation of 
testing and assessment of system safety, 2006). 
Auguston’s work in Environmental Behavior Models is particularly 
applicable to the naval gun weapon system software safety domain as the 




system are approved.  Jackson's “Small Scope Hypothesis” (Jackson, Software 
abstractions: logic, language, and analysis, 2006) (Jackson & Damon, Elements 
of style: Analyzing a software design feature with a counter example detector, 
1996) argues that a high proportion of bugs can be found by testing the system 
within some small scope.  Jackson’s hypothesis, combined with Auguston’s work 
in environmental modeling, is particularly applicable when attempting to solve the 
issue of evaluating software safety issues during the naval gun weapon system 
acquisition process.  
Software safety research in real-time systems has led to the development 
of the Tempo Toolkit.  The Tempo Toolkit is an extension of the IOA toolkit, 
which provides a specification simulator, a code generator, and both model-
checking and theorem-proving support for analyzing specifications.  The toolkit 
consists of the Tempo language, which closely matches the format of the 
pseudo-code used for IOA.  The Timed I/O Automaton Language (TIOA) 
provides the semantic basis for the Tempo Toolset (Archer, Lim, Mitra, Lynch, & 
Umeno, 2008).  
H. SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE FLEXIBILITY: AN ACQUISITION RISK 
The SSSTRP evaluation process was meant to support a streamlined, 
thorough evaluation of proposed gun weapon system changes.  Naval gun 
weapon systems require architectural flexibility in order to respond to new and 
improved software capabilities that strengthen a ship’s weapons systems.  One 
of the major benefits of component-based architecture is the flexibility that is 
allowed by the process.  Flexibility is necessary because “software needs to be 
flexible in order to be adapted to new or changing work situations in its context of 
use” (Wulf, Pipek, & Won, 2008).  The flexibility with which software systems are 
developed will carry through to the implementation stage of the process and will 
be required to continue past the point of implementation in order to provide for 
changing requirements.  Component–based architecture is ideal for providing 
flexibility because individual components can be upgraded or replaced as needs 




from a database component can have its user interface changed as user 
requirements or technologies evolve, without affecting the existing database 
component (Wulf, Pipek, & Won, 2008).  Component-based development has the 
potential to reduce maintenance costs, as the components can be updated only 
as needed, rather than requiring a full refactoring of the system in order to update 
one part of the system.  Wulf et al. described an end-user framework that 
described a way in which the software development process can be flexible 
enough to allow changing user needs while reducing the difficulty and 
maintenance costs associated with these changes (Wulf, Pipek, & Won, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 3: CBD Flexibility Framework (From Wulf, Pipek, & Won, 2008) 
Component-based architecture and software design provides a way to 
design systems to account for system requirements without excessive cost or 
development time.  It is based in assembling software components, which may 
be either custom-designed vendor-sourced custom components, semi-custom 
components (such as ERP modules), or commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
software components.  Although the component-based architecture process is 
flexible and modular, there are difficulties relating to the black-box nature of 
many components, including difficulty evaluating nonfunctional requirements like 





I. DEPT OF THE NAVY OPEN ARCHITECTURE ENTERPRISE (OA 
ENTERPRISE) PROGRAM 
The requirement for naval gun weapon systems to use open architecture 
was established in 2005 in a memo from the Navy Program Management Office.  
The memo states that, “Naval OA transformation must match the rapid evolution 
in commercial and military technology.  Not only must we shorten the kill chain 
across the family of systems; we must also shorten the cost it takes to deliver 
capability requirements” (Department of the Navy, 2005).  Motivations for the 
adoption of open architecture included reduction of cost and time invested in 
developing and implementing new systems, and the ability to design systems 
that are technologically advanced, as compared to the previous development life 
cycle, in which the end product was typically obsolete by the time it was placed in 
service (Department of the Navy, 2005).  Principles for the OA system 
implemented by the Navy include the following:  
 Modular design and design disclosure 
 Reusable software components selected using a best-in-breed 
strategy, rather than the previous single-vendor strategy 
 Interoperable joint warfare communication and information 
exchange capability 
 Design for life cycle affordability, including tactics such as system 
design and development and support for COTS obsolescence 
 Encouragement of alternate solutions and sources in order to 
improve competitive practices and system capabilities (Department 
of the Navy 2) 
The OA Enterprise system is required to be integrated into all Navy 
systems and system requirements, and is one of the first identifiable federal 
programs that require open architecture in the system (Department of the Navy, 
2005).  The Navy established an Open Architecture Enterprise Team (OAET) to 




respected in all ongoing and future Navy system designs.  The document also 
included short-term objectives and system requirements to begin using the OA 
Enterprise program immediately while the long-term details were worked out.  
The program has been active since that time. 
The Navy OA model is described in the OA Assessment Model 
(Department of the Navy, 2005).  The OAAM is built on a matrix framework using 
business and architectural/technical characteristics; the level of compliance of 
each system is assessed on the individual criteria.  Figure 3 demonstrates the 
OAAM’s matrix; the chart details the level of business and technical compliance 
(Department of the Navy, 2005).  Each level of the model is accompanied by 
business integration and architectural technical characteristics; in both axes, “0” 
represents the least integration of open architecture principles, while “4” 
represents the highest level. 
 
 





Level Business Technical 
0 Isolated Closed 
1 Connected Layered 
2 Migrating to openness Layered and open 
3 Common Common 
4 Open and net-centric Enterprise 
Table 3: OAAM Development Levels (From Department of the Navy, 2005) 
The OA Enterprise Contract Guidebook is produced by the Navy to ease 
the integration of open architecture as a design requirement.  The OA Enterprise 
Contract Guidebook offers insight into the program’s intentions toward the use of 
open architecture and how it handles the acquisition of it.  The guidebook, 
designed as part of the Navy’s Open Architecture Enterprise (OA Enterprise) 
initiative, is intended to “provide Program Managers, Contracting Officers, and 
their supporting organizations with guidance and example contract language to 
assist them in incorporating open architecture principles into their contracts” 
(Department of the Navy, 2008).  The document also provides insight into the 
use of open architecture within the Navy, including its history, requirements, and 
scope.   
The intent of the document is not to enforce the use of the language 
required, but to suggest appropriate language for the contracts used for 
acquisition of open architecture products.  The document also provides an 
overview of Naval OA architecture and intent.  The principles of design include 
use of both COTS and open standards in order to ensure interoperability and 
fast-swap capabilities for software, and includes standard interfaces to ensure 
system communications capabilities (Department of the Navy, 2008).  It is noted 
that regardless of the source of the software component, it should be compliant 
with the OA Assessment Model (OAAM) at the highest level possible for the 
given system. 
The Contract Guidebook provides insight into the software and systems 
development process required by the Navy.  The OA Enterprise program was 




was up to date, maintainable, and reliable.  By using the open architecture 
paradigm as a requirement for new systems design, the Navy gained the ability 
to update its systems easily, to interface its systems, and to ensure that its 
systems could remain functional in spite of COTS obsolescence.  It also placed 
the government in a stronger position by requiring that the purchasing 
organization seek out and exercise intellectual property and data rights.  Few 
Navy documents described live projects that had been undertaken using the new 
guidelines; examples of the outcomes of these guidelines were derived from the 
literature rather than Navy documentation.   
J. SOFTWARE ACQUISITION CHALLENGES OF A NAVAL GUN 
WEAPON SYSTEM 
Testing and software evaluation of a naval gun weapon system that is 
composed of COTS products is a known problem (Bhansali, 2005).  Azani 
discussed the specifics of testing and evaluation of the open system in terms of 
strategic requirements and goals (Azani, 2001).  Azani noted that the use of open 
systems provided government IT systems with advantages, including the ability 
to take advantage of best-in-breed commercial systems and ensure 
interoperability, commonality, portability within the system, and the ability to 
replace obsolete systems.  Without careful system design, the testing and 
evaluation of a system assembled from multiple commercial components could 
be exceptionally difficult to complete successfully.   
The design of a testing system that can handle multiple products from 
various vendors is complex, particularly in cases where some parts of the system 
may be COTS that do not have open-code bases to allow specific design of the 
test systems. The testing and evaluation of an open system should be 
determined before implementing the system, and priority should be given to 
designing for test and evaluation ease (Azani, 2001).  Rajsuman and Noriyuki 
presented one solution to the problem.  The Open Architecture Test System was 
designed to provide a method to test the implementation and integration of open 




Noriyuki, 2004).  The architecture proposed was intended to test the full 
operation of the system.  The architecture also allowed for live testing and 
simulation, and was intended to decrease testing time and simplify the testing 
process (Rajsuman & Noriyuki, 2004).  Integrated system and user test 
architecture would be a useful addition to an organization transitioning to an open 
architecture requirements paradigm. 
Another software safety issue that may emerge in the use of an open 
architecture is the dependability of the system.  Barrett offered one solution to 
ensuring reliability in open architecture systems, the Delta-4 project, which is 
defined as “an open, fault-tolerant, distributed computing architecture for use in 
application areas such as computer-integrated manufacturing, process control, 
and office automation” (Barrett, 1993).  The system was intended to address the 
issue of reliability in open architecture systems that were used in applications 
that required reliable throughput and response time; however, the author noted 
that the system was not designed for mission-critical or safety applications 
(Barrett, 1993).  The system was based on a Dependable Communication 
System with the components of the architecture spread through computers and 
linked by the Dependable Communication System.  Software components could 
be replicated to provide redundancy, with the caveat that host machine 
configurations had to be consistent across machines in order for the redundancy 
capability to be used (Barrett, 1993).  The communications system allowed for 
multi-point communication, providing for robust and dependable communication 
between replicated units.  The system also offered fault-tolerance in order to 
provide a level of protection against hardware failures and a variety of 
communication mechanisms (Barrett, 1993). 
Although Barrett’s system is not intended for mission-critical systems, it 
provides a blueprint for how the requirement for dependability may alter the 
design of an open system.  Enhancements to the system would be required in 
order to allow for the level of dependability required in more mission-critical 





A third issue in analyzing potential software solutions for a naval gun 
weapon system is the problem of trusted computing.  Naval gun weapon systems 
have a strict requirement to restrict access to trusted users (and systems) and to 
assure that security level.  Trusted computing within an SoS becomes more 
difficult because components and their authentication methods may be changed 
in an ad hoc manner and the overall design of the system may not be set at the 
initial use of the system (England, Lampson, Manferdelli, Peinado, & Willman, 
2003).   
K. SOFTWARE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FRAMEWORKS 
Initial searches found numerous frameworks related to software safety.  
This review is focused on frameworks that make the software package a primary 
target of the evaluation.  While some of these frameworks have been established 
in the working software development environment, others have only been 
described within the academic computer science area.  The majority of those 
identified standards are from military or other safety-critical areas rather than 
from the business or consumer software environment.  Most of these standards 
have been developed for use in military, transportation, medical, communication, 
and nuclear power systems (Medikonda & Panchumarthy, 2009).  As Barrett 
Medikonda and Panchumarthy noted, most of these systems are real-time 
control systems, lending an extra level of complexity to safety requirements 
design.   
The research describes a number of frameworks and identifies potential 
advantages and disadvantages for use within the Naval Weapons Gunfire 
software systems.  Table 4 contains the known software safety requirements 
standards that use software safety and security features as a main component 
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As noted in Table 4, most of these systems are designed for use in safety-
critical real-time applications, indicating that characteristics of any of them could 
be considered appropriate when examining the potential applicability to the Naval 
Weapons Gunfire system.  However, standards such as ANSI/AAMI SW58:2001, 
which focus on safety-critical application of medical software, may not be as 
appropriately applied to the current problem as other defense standards may be.  
Identified standards that may be most applicable to the current research problem 
include MoD 00-55, MoD 00-56, DO-178B, Mil-Std-882, Software Safety Hdbk, 
IEC 61508-3, NASA-STD-8719.13, and IEEE 1228.  The MoD 00-55 and MoD 
00-56 will be excluded from consideration due to their focus on the United 
Kingdom’s military requirements which, although similar to those of the United 
States, are not completely applicable.  A specific study of IEC 61508-3 and 
NASA-STD-8719.13 are found later in this chapter, as both are highly applicable 
to the current research problem.   
Software requirements frameworks focused on software safety tend to be 
highly customized to the environment, rather than being generic models; 
although attempts have been made to define a generic software safety 
requirements framework, these attempts have not been successful (Bhansali, 
2005).  General criteria for a software safety requirements framework have been 
identified by Bhansali (Bhansali, 2005).  The general subset of requirements has 
been identified by examination of known software safety standards.  Table 5 
indicates the required elements identified in order to establish what Bhansali 
describes as the minimum subset of requirements needed to generate a one-
size-fits-all software safety requirements framework.  These requirements were 
identified by examination of standards from across all areas of industry, 
government, and safety-critical applications.  Though Bhansali identified the 
specific required elements for such a generic framework, he did not make any 
determination of how these elements should be implemented.  Bhansali’s model 
of a generic requirements framework indicated five levels of security, with 
different levels required for each of these models; the assumption was that there 




requirements for safety standards and specifications.  The application domain 
would determine in most cases which of these requirements was needed at 
which level (Bhansali, 2005).  The requirements for each level are identified 
within this research; however, the requirements at each level would need to be 
determined by the overall requirements of the system in question, rather than 
through a generic modeling process.  (Bhansali, 2005).   
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Table 5: Required Elements for a Generic Software Safety Requirements 
Framework (From Bhansali, 2005) 
A truly generic model has not yet been established to drive the 
construction of software safety in any application domain.  A number of models 
that increase the generality of existing models or provide a general model that 
can be used to identify the safety requirements of a given system have been 
constructed.  One recent model which integrates the factors, criteria, and models 
(FCM) approach of McCall and Boehm (more commonly used in quality analysis 




Panchumarthy (Medikonda & Panchumarthy, 2009), and is demonstrated in the 
figure below.  As can be seen in the system, the primary interaction with the 
requirements process within the framework is the completeness of requirements 
(based on system hazard analysis), and the identification of safety critical 
requirements is the main area in which criteria regarding software requirements 
interact.  Many distinctions between levels of safety requirements are used in the 
model.  These levels include safety requirements, which specify how safe the 
system should be (identified in many models by safety levels, as noted by 
Bhansali); safety-significant requirements, or functional and other quality 
requirements for safety requirement achievement; safety system requirements, 
which are requirements for internal safety systems such as automated shutoff 
switches, fire protection systems, etc; and safety constraints, or requirements for 
use of specific safety systems (Medikonda & Panchumarthy, 2009).  Appropriate 
identification within the requirements-setting stage is key in Medikonda and 
Panchumarthy’s model for identifying the requirements for software safety 
quality.  Medikonda and Panchumarthy’s model has not yet been placed into 






Figure 5: Software Safety Framework (After Medikonda & Panchumarthy, 
2009) 
L. NASA SOFTWARE SAFETY STANDARD (NASA-STD-8719.13) 
One of the most comprehensive software safety requirements frameworks 
available is the NASA standard NASA-STD-8719.13 and its accompanying 
support materials and frameworks.  The standard is applied to all software used 
in NASA (NASA, 2009), which makes the comprehensive software safety 
standard particularly applicable to the SSSTRP domain.  The NASA standards 
for software safety have emerged from examination of the causes and effects of 
aerospace accidents, and determination of requirements for software safety that 
have emerged from the area (NASA, 2009).  NASA-STD-8719.13 is based on the 
NASA Safety Manual (NPR 8753.3), which identifies the characteristics of safe 
systems and describes how these systems can be appropriately identified 
(NASA, 2009).  The standard is accompanied by a guidebook, NASA-GB-
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8719.13, which offers information on how the standard should be applied within 
the process of software engineering and requirements determination.  The NASA 
standard is intended to apply to custom-engineered software, commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS), modified off-the-shelf (MOTS), and government off-the-shelf 
(GOTS) software (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2004).  The 
NASA standard is one of the most fully-featured software safety requirements 
available.  
NASA 8719.13 identifies software safety requirements starting in the 
conceptual phase of the software design or acquisition process (National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2004).  The 8719.13 document purpose 
is described as being “to provide requirements to implement a systematic 
approach to software safety as an integral part of the project’s overall system 
safety program, software development and software assurance processes” 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2004).  Process and technical 
requirements for system safety are included in the description.  Requirements for 
identifying safety-critical applications and systems that will impact these safety-
critical applications, project management, planning and control activities, life 
cycle analysis, and software safety throughout the software life cycle are 
addressed;  also identified are areas that would require modified approaches to 
software safety, such as COTS, MOTS, or GOTS systems (National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, 2004).  Legacy systems and the regulations for 
ensuring that these systems adhere to current safety standards and 
requirements are addressed (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
2004). 
The NASA standard contains a comprehensive discussion of how to 
determine whether or not a given system is safety-critical. For the evaluation, it 
uses guidelines including factors such as the cause or contribution of a hazard, 
hazard control or mitigation, and processing safety-critical commands or data 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2004).  The detailed application 
behavior identification approach is intended to provide a complete risk 




exist for its determination.  The process of identifying software safety 
requirements is performed through a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), or risk 
assessment process, which examines the role of the software within the overall 
system.  Software evaluation occurs during the conceptualization phase, before 
the planning for custom software or acquisition of non-custom software begins 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2004).  The process of the PHA 
involves identifying hazards for specific requirements or system design choices 
for the software, and an overall system safety analysis (National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, 2004).  These analyses are then used to construct specific 
safety requirements for the software in terms of functionality and contextual 
placement within the system as a whole (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 2004).  These requirements are designated as software safety 
requirements, which are then integrated into the design or acquisition process 
alongside other functional and nonfunctional requirements for the software 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2004).  A software safety plan 
is established and is maintained alongside the software as a record of the safety 
choices that were made during the conceptual stage of the design process.  The 
model identifies archival processes that should be undertaken.  The 
accompanying Guidebook can be used to operationalize the standard within the 
organizational environment; although the Guidebook is specific to NASA’s 
organizational and development structure, much of the information within it is 
applicable to the naval gun weapon system domain.   
M. IEC 61508-3 
IEC 61508-3 is the IEC standard subsection that identifies the process of 
requirements determination for safety-critical applications (Medikonda & 
Panchumarthy, 2009).  Although IEC 61508 was only published between 1998 
and 2000, it had been in development since the mid-1980s through a Task Group 
designed to assess the challenges involved in ensuring software safety in 
programmable electronic systems (PES); these systems include computers and 




parts of IEC 61508, including Functional Safety and IEC 61508; General 
Requirements; Requirements for Electrical, Electronic and Programmable 
Electronic Systems; Software Requirements; Definitions and Abbreviations; 
Examples of Methods for the Determination of Safety-integrity Levels; Guidelines 
on the Application of parts two and 6; and Overview of Techniques and 
Measures (Bell, 2006).  Part 3 (Software Requirements) holds the normative 
requirements (indicated by “shall”) that are applicable (Bell, 2006). 
As in NASA-8719.13, IEC 61508’s safety requirements determination 
process contains a preliminary evaluation of the requirements for the system 
design (Bell, 2006).  The focus is safety, as determined at the functional 
specification level, since research has indicated that the functional specification 
process is where the majority of safety-related failures in software occur (Bell, 
2006).  IEC 61508 is built on four safety integrity levels, which identify potential 
failure points and identify measures for overcoming the potential for failure within 
these systems (Bell, 2006).  These safety integrity levels are identified through 
the probability of failure, although these identifications are different depending on 
the level of the function’s demand and/or continuous operational mode (Bell, 
2006).  In the case of a low-demand software system or component, the 
probability is defined as the probability that the component will fail to perform 
when demanded, while for high-demand and continuously operating systems, the 
definition is the probability of a dangerous failure per hour (Bell, 2006).  IEC 
61508 takes a risk-based approach to determining software safety, identifying the 
potential outcomes of a failure as well as its probability in order to determine 
whether a design is acceptable or unacceptable in terms of safety (Bell, 2006).   
IEC 61508 identifies requirements determination for software safety 
requirements and includes a complete software life cycle approach to 
determining software safety in the overall case (Bell, 2006).  Figure 5 






Figure 6: IEC 61508 Life Cycle Framework (From Bell, 2006) 
As demonstrated by Bell’s IEC 61508 Life cycle Framework, the focus on 
safety requirements is during the conceptual process and before integration.  
Unlike the NASA standard, little attention is paid to off-the-shelf software or the 
modification of legacy software, which could be rectified by modification of the 
framework structure in order to meet the needs of the current research.   
Although IEC 61508 is presented as a universal standard for software 
safety requirements, the framework lacks focus and features for other areas of 
software design (vitally, in this case, excluding military applications), and “the 
approach taken is ‘do it all’ or to justify not doing it at all” (Bhansali, 2005).  Thus, 
IEC 61508 does not meet the requirements for naval gun weapon system 
software safety evaluation.  The IEC 61508 standard does not directly apply to 
the naval gun weapon system SSSTRP environment; however, it has been used 





61508 is a paid standard, it has a record of positive application, and it is a 
carefully designed standard that can be modified to meet many of the needs of 
the current project.   
In summary, the IEC 61508 standard is less complete than NASA 8719.13 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2004), as it does not contain 
requirements or specifications for functional safety or safety verification 
requirements, which decreases the scope of safety requirements determination it 
offers (Bell, 2006).  These potential disadvantages do not remove the IEC 61508 
standard from consideration for use in the naval gun weapon system domain, but 
do reduce its utility and increase the amount of difficulty involved in the system’s 
use. 
N. SUMMARY 
The literature review discusses the current state of methodology and tools 
within the software safety domain, with specific focus on enterprise systems.  
This review contained information about COTS integration risks, vendor 
selection, software acquisition, software architecture, the Navy’s Open 
Architecture Enterprise Program, abstract modeling methodologies, and software 
safety standards and frameworks. 
The literature review has demonstrated the need for a modeling 
methodology that can model the system’s interaction with the environment.  
Additionally, a capability gap exists that enables the SSSTRP evaluation team to 
accomplish an evaluation of both functional and nonfunctional requirements, 
such as performance aspects, speed of execution, and other software safety 
quality of service indicators.  The next chapter addresses the details of a solution 
to the problem of pre-acquisition software safety analysis using the Monterey 








III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE MODELING METHODOLOGY 
FOR NAVAL GUN WEAPON SYSTEM SOFTWARE  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Introduction chapter explains the specific problems associated with 
the SSSTRP naval acquisition process, and the concept of the system 
architecture modeling methodology that was developed to address these 
problems.  This chapter also contains demonstrations of prototype software that 
implements the modeling methodology, as well as test cases using a naval gun 
weapon system.  Finally, this chapter contains a suggested prototype SSSTRP 
evaluation methodology that describes how the tools may be implemented within 
the current SSSTRP process.   
Providing the SSSTRP community with high-level models that may satisfy 
a portion of the software safety assessment process improves the current 
inspection-based evaluation methodology.  Without a high-level modeling 
process, the alternative is to implement the system and to perform testing.  
Manual testing is a very expensive and timely alternative, which may be partially 
satisfied using the prototype methodology and tools that are covered in this 
chapter. 
The proposed SSSTRP evaluation methodology and tools that are 
demonstrated in this chapter improve the SSSTRP evaluation process in the 
following ways: 
 Identify unintended system behaviors 
 Provide a high-fidelity system safety assessment 
 Tools for evaluating nonfunctional requirements 
 Perform assessments at appropriate levels of abstraction 
The goal for the gun weapon system case study is to test a proposed 





B. DESCRIPTION OF A NAVAL GUN WEAPON SYSTEM 
The U.S. Navy gun system diagram used for this research was provided 
by the U.S. Navy's Weapons Explosive Review Board (WESERB) as part of the 
documentation that accompanies the research in Chapter I.  The gun weapon 
system contains 17 separate systems, all connected through a single network.  
The gun weapon system was modeled using MP event grammar.  The modeling 
application, herein referred to as "Eagle6," is the product of this research.  The 
Eagle6 application accepts MP modeling language and gives the user the ability 
to write formal queries that return specific sets of scenarios.  For the purposes of 
defining limitations and definitions of scope, we have defined Scope as the 
number of model iterations.   
Eagle6 (explained in detail later in this dissertation) uses an exhaustive 
and probabilistic approach to generating scenarios, and has the following 
capability: 
 Eagle6 is based on executable models and is able to generate all 
possible scenarios within a given scope. 
 Eagle6 provides a high-level abstraction of the interaction between 
a software system and its environment. 
 Eagle6 supports multiple views of system architecture that are 
generated from the same MP model. 
 Eagle6 supports random scenario generation for statistical 
evaluation. 
The following is a description of the systems in the Gun weapon system 
model, with the model abbreviation in brackets: 
Systems Included in the Gun weapon system Model: 
 C&D [CD]-Command and Decision.  The software system that 
performs all functions within the Aegis combat system 




 AN/SPY-1D [R3D]-3-D Air Defense and Surface Search Phased 
Array Radar 
 Gun Mount Processor AN/UYK-44 EP/OSM [GMP]-One sub-
element of the GCS, which takes information from the GCC and 
provides services to the gun mount 
 Gun Console Computer [GCC]-Sub-element of the GCS. It 
interfaces with Aegis and other ship sensors and performs fire 
control calculations and provides data to the GMP. 
 Optical Sight System MK 46 Mod 1-Control Display Console MK 
132 Mod 0 [CDC]-The operator console used to control the MK46 
Optical Sight 
 Optical Sight System MK 46 Mod 1-Electro-Optic Director MK 85 
Mod 1 [EOD]-The Optical Sight director system (installed above the 
bridge) that rotates and elevates per operator’s commands.  The 
TV, IR, and laser range finder sensors are installed on the director, 
which points them in the right position 
 Gun Mount Control Panel MK 437 Mod 1 [GMCP]-Backup 
Operator's console installed below the gun mount.  It is used in 
case the main ADS console in the combat information center goes 
down. 
 Gun Mount EX 45 Mod 4 [GM]-The 5” gun mount.  Holds 20 rounds 
in the drum and fires 18-20 rounds per minute. 
 AEGIS Display System [System_ADS]-The software that drives all 
displays and console operator actions within the ship’s Aegis 
combat system (The operator interface software to C&D). 




 AEGIS Clock/Gyro Data Converter Cabinets (2) 
[System_ACGDCC]-System that provides time and ship’s attitude 
information to C&D. 
 FODMS [System_FODMS]-Data Multiplexing System. 
 Gun Computer System [System_GCS]-System used to perform all 
core gun fire control functionality. 
 Recorder/Reproducer MK27 Mod 1 [System_Recorder]-Part of the 
GCS that is responsible for loading operational program data and 
recording GCS data. 
 Velocimeter MK 5 Mod 0 [System_Velocimeter]-The sensor (radar) 
on the MK 45 Gun Mount that monitors outgoing projectiles after 
firing and calculates projectile velocity, used to improve fire control 
accuracy. 
 Control Panel EP2 MK 281 Mod 9 [System_CP]-The electronic 
panel that is used to turn on, set up, load, and locally control the 








C. IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS FOUND IN THE PRE-
ACQUISITION SOFTWARE SAFETY EVALUATION PROCESS 
1. Domain-Specific Issues Covered in This Research 
The primary responsibility of the SSSTRP is to identify possible hazard 
states when evaluating a proposed gun weapon system change.  Our research 
showed many areas of the SSSTRP process that warrant attention, but the focus 
of our research was narrowed in order to enable us to focus on the following 
critical issues: 
 Testing domain architecture models for software safety violations–The 
goal of this research is to provide a solution that enables the SSSTRP to 
automatically generate a number of scenarios that test for software safety 
violations. 
 Estimation of software performance based on architecture models–The 
goal of this research is to create tools that enable the SSSTRP to test 
nonfunctional requirements using Formal Methods.  The tool answers the 
question, “How will the software behave once it is a part of our system?” 
2. Domain-specific Issues Not Covered in This Research 
 Software inspection techniques 
 SSSTRP structure and evaluation methodology 
 Vendor Technical Data Package design/structure 
 System functionality overlap in Open Architecture (OA) 
environments 
 Development of more specific and effective guidelines for how to 





D. OVERVIEW OF THE MONTEREY PHOENIX METHODOLOGY 
MP was chosen for this research because it satisfies three primary needs 
for this domain: 
 MP has the ability to model nonfunctional requirements.  Testing 
how a system interacts with the environment is a critical need that 
has not been available to the SSSTRP. 
 MP has the ability to evaluate formal Assertions.  Because MP 
results are obtained from an exhaustive generation of all scenarios 
within scope, determining Hazard States enables the SSSTRP to 
evaluate potential system changes with greater effectiveness. 
 MP has the ability to extract visual representations of scenarios, 
thereby yielding a result that is usable and readable by the layman. 
MP Modeling Definitions 
MP is used in this domain to create a model with a set of architectural 
properties.  Attributes are properties of an event that may be used to define 
domain model representations.  Attributes are valuable as they represent a more 
detailed (and measurable) application state.  The intention is to model the 
concept of an event state associated with the event, thereby enabling the ability 
to evaluate the model for predefined unsafe states. 
1. MP Scenario (Event Trace) 
An Event is defined as any detectible action.  A scenario is a set of events 
of different types and two sets of relationships between them (IN and 
PRECEDES).   
A grammar rule has form:  
A: right-hand-part, where A is an event type name. Event types that 
do not appear in the left hand part of rules are considered atomic. 





Event Relationships IN and PRECEDES 
 
 
Figure 8: MP Event Trace 
 
MP modeling requires a ROOT event that represents the starting point for 
a series of following relational events.  In the following examples, R, A, B, C are 
events, and the event R is the ROOT event:  
 R: {A B C} – Root event  R contains UNORDERED events 
A, B, and C 
 R: (A B C) – Root event R contains ORDERED events A, B, 
and C 
 R: {* A *} – ROOT event R may have zero or more 
UNORDERED events A 
 R: (* A *) – ROOT event R contains zero or more ORDERED 
events A 
 R: [A] – ROOT event R may contain optional event A 
 R: (A | B | C) – ROOT event R contains either A or B or C 






2. Unordered Events: R: {A B C} 
Event R contains events A,B,C.  Events A,B,C are not ordered (no 
precedes relationship between them). 
Optional Event Traces for R: {A B C} 
 
Figure 9: MP Unordered Events: R: {A B C} 
 
3. Ordered Events: R: (A B C) 
Event R contains events A, B, C.  Events A, B, C are ordered: A precedes 
B, B precedes C; 
Event Traces for R: (A B C) 
 
Figure 10: MP Ordered Events: R: (A B C) 
4. Multiple Unordered Events: R: {* A *} 
The * is used to allow the modeler to describe an event that happens zero 





Event Traces for R: {* A *} 
 
Figure 11: MP Multiple Unordered Events: R: {* A *} 
5. Multiple Ordered Events: R: (* A *) 
This sequence denotes a set of zero or more events of type A with an 
ordering relation between them.  Given an expansion scope of n, event R has 
(n+1) scenarios.  










6. Optional Events: R: [A] 
This sequence denotes an optional event A.  Event R has two scenarios: 
one scenario where R is empty, and one scenario where R contains A. 
Optional Events for R: [A] 
 
 
Figure 13: MP Optional Events: R:[A]  
 
7. Alternative Events: R: (A | B | C) 
Alternative events are denoted by separating events by using vertical 
bars.  The following example contains three alternative events, event B, event C, 
or event D. Event R has three scenarios. One scenario where R contains A, one 
scenario where R contains B, and one scenario where R contains C: 
 








8. Introduction of SHARE ALL Construct and Constraints 
The construct SHARE ALL is used to describe event coordination and 
system constraints.  The SHARE ALL construct identifies events that can be 
shared by other events.  The following MP model contains two components 
TaskA and TaskB with a connector between them. A Connector enables 
components to interact, for example send and receive a message, call each 
other and pass a parameter, or use a shared memory to deliver a data item. The 
schema Send_Receive_Activity specifies the behavior of components involved in 




ROOT TaskA: (Send); 
ROOT TaskB: (Receive); 
ROOT Connector: (Send Receive); 
------------------------------ 
TaskA, Connector SHARE ALL Send; 
TaskB, Connector SHARE ALL Receive; 
 
The rule section introduces Root events TaskA, TaskB, and Connector, 
while Send and Receive events are needed to specify the root event’s structure. 
The event type stands for a set of event traces satisfying the event structure 
defined for that type. The constraints section uses the predicate share all, which 
is defined as X, Y are root events, and Z is an event type: 
X, Y SHARE ALL Z  { v: Z | v IN X} = {w: Z | w IN Y} 
 
 




The events are represented by rectangles (red rectangles are ROOT 
events, and green rectangles are non-ROOT events), and the relationships are 
represented by arrows (blue dashed arrows are IN relationships, and black solid 
line arrows are PRECEDES relationships). 
The example of MP contains: 
 TaskA(1), Connector(5), and TaskB(3) are ROOT events 
 Send(2) and Receive(4) are non-ROOT events of type 
TaskA 
 Receive(4) is a shared event of TaskB and Connector(5) 
 Send(2) PRECEDES Receive(4) 
 Connector(5), TaskB(3) are IN Receive(4) 
9. MP Attributes 
There are two types of attributes: static and dynamic.  Static attributes are 
values that are set at the beginning of a model and do not change.  Dynamic 
attributes have a value that may change in different parts of the scenario.  The 
Eagle6 prototype uses static attributes that enable query language.  Dynamic 
attributes are reserved for future research (Auguston & Whitcomb, System 
architecture specification based on behavior models, 2010). 
10. MP Expansion Scope Construct 
Scope is defined as the number of model iterations. The purpose of the 
Expansion Scope is to limit the size of the "*" rule in order to better define the 
scenario’s parameters.  For example, if the test scenario requires the gun 
weapon system to fire three rounds, the scenario’s scope is set to “3,” thereby 
removing the infinite (“*”) default parameter.  In the absence of an Expansion 
Scope that is detailed in the model design, setting this value will result in a finite 




MP language by setting an expansion scope each time the “*” rule 
is defined as: 
  (* <m-n> *) 
<n> is considered an abbreviation for <0-n> 
 ( * <0-n> event * ) and { * <0-n> event * } 
Becomes 
 ( * <n> event * ) and { * <n> event * } 
11. Example MP Model 
The following example MP code contains a scenario that contains naval 
guns, with each gun firing at a target.  The test scenario represented in MP is as 
follows: 
 A minimum of 1 gun system, and a maximum of two gun systems 
 Each weapon can fire zero, one, or two times, maximum. 




ROOT GWS_Cycle_Test: { * <1-2> Gun_System *}; 
Gun_System: (* <2> Shoot *); 
Shoot: (Load Fire (Hit | Miss)); 
 
The MP code is described as follows: 
MP Code: "ROOT GWS_Cycle_Test: { * <1-2> Gun_System *}; 
Description: The initiating event (ROOT) is called the GWS_Cycle_Test.  





MP Code: "Gun_System: (* <0-2> Shoot *); 
Description: The Gun_System has zero, one, or two Shoot events. 
 
MP Code: "Shoot: (Load Fire (Hit | Miss));" 
Description: The Shoot event has one event that ends in a Hit or Miss 
event. 
 
The MP code resulted in a total of 20 possible scenarios, with the scenario 





















 Figure 18:  Scenario Generated from MP Schema: GWS_Cycle_Test 
Scenario #20 
12. Small Scope Hypothesis 
The gun weapon system model uses event grammar and includes the 
ability to execute exhaustive testing for scenario generation within scope 
(Auguston, Monterey Phoenix, or How to Make Software Executable, 2009), 
(Andoni, Daniliuc, Sarfraz, & Marinov, 2002).  Our hypothesis of finding unsafe 
system states using a small scope size is based on Jackson’s Small Scope 
Hypothesis. “Small Scope Hypothesis” (Jackson, Software abstractions: logic, 
language, and analysis, 2006) (Jackson & Damon, Elements of style: Analyzing a 
software design feature with a counter example detector, 1996) argues that a 
high proportion of bugs can be found by testing the system within a small scope 
of test cycles.  The ability to introduce environmental events such as missiles, 





(Auguston, Software architecture built from behavior models, 2009) showed that 
MP is able to introduce critical environmental events that have a high probability 
of rendering the gun system unsafe. 
 
 
Figure 19: Jackson's Small Scope Hypothesis (After Jackson, Software 
abstractions: logic, language, and analysis, 2006) 
Jackson's Small Scope Hypothesis that most errors can be demonstrated 
on small counter examples is demonstrated in Eagle6.  Eagle6 has two primary 
means for evaluating software safety using relatively small scope sizes: 
Exhaustive Search – Exhaustive search is the process of generating all 
possible scenarios from the MP model up to a given scope, and querying the 
result set.  The Exhaustive Search enables the user to find scenarios that 
produce counter-examples of assertions. 
Random Approach – Random approach is designed to generate random 
scenarios within scope to calculate statistical estimates.  The purpose of this 
functionality is to create estimates that are used for software safety assessments. 
Summary: Jackson’s Small Scope Hypothesis graph represents the idea 
that an exhaustive test within a small scope is much better than an unstructured 




13. Use Case Representation in MP 
The following demonstration includes a simple gun weapon system use 
case and the corresponding MP model.  The purpose of the demonstration is to 
show that MP has the capability to extract use cases from an MP model, thereby 
creating the capacity for formal testing.  
 
Figure 20: Gun weapon system Fire Use Case Diagram in UML Notation 
UML Actors: 
 Gun Console Computer [GCC] - Sub-element of the GCS. It 
interfaces with Aegis and other ship sensors and performs fire 
control calculations and provides data to the GMP. 





 Gun Mount Control Panel [GMCP] - Backup Operator's console 
installed below the gun mount.  It is used in case the main ADS 
console in the combat information center goes down. 
 Gun Mount Processor [GMP] - One sub-element of the GCS, which 
takes information from the GCC and provides services to the gun 
mount 
Use Cases: 
 Radar Get Target Position - Uses the Radar information to get the 
target position. 
 Radar Assign Target - Uses information from the Radar and Gun 
Console Computer to assign the target. 
 Get Ship Altitude - Calculates the ship's current altitude. 
 Get Ship Speed - Calculates the ship's current speed. 
 Aim Target - Uses the information from the Gun Mount Control 
Panel Actor and Gun Console Computer Actor, as well as the Get 
Ship Altitude and Get Ship Speed Use Cases to set the gun aiming 
function. 
 Fire At Target - Uses information from Gun Mount Processor and 
Gun Console Computer to execute a fire command. 
 
14. Use Case MP Model 























ROOT GunMount_activity: { 
 FireAtTarget 
}; 
GunConsoleComputer_activity, GunMount_activity SHARE ALL 
FireAtTarget; 
GunConsoleComputer_activity, RadarSystem_activity SHARE ALL 
RadarAssignTarget; 
GunConsoleComputer_activity, GunMountControlPanel_activity SHARE 





The following figure represents a scenario generated from the MP model: 
 
Figure 21: Example of Use Case Modeling via MP 
 
In UML, Uses Case designs may contain conditional nodes.  Use Case 
views generated by MP are single views of Use Case scenarios which clarify 
potential system behavior. 
15. Evaluation of MP 
MP has several features that apply to the gun weapon system software 
safety domain: 
 MP provides a high level of abstraction–The MP modeling 
methodology has the capability to model system behavior at the 
abstract level without any detailed information about the specific 
system (Rivera, 2010).  This attribute allows for testing and 
debugging earlier in the acquisition life cycle, as there is no need to 
continue the acquisition process if safety-related issues are found 
during the initial stages of evaluation. 
 MP supports continuous refinement–The ability to insert an event 
such as a missile strike, power outage, or any other environmental 
event is critical for testing a potential system change.  Systems 
work well in the lab.  MP allows for the ability to test using an 
environment model.  The ability to bring together the environment 




allows for this new capability (Auguston & Whitcomb, System 
architecture specification based on behavior models, 2010). 
 The MP framework provides high-level abstractions that may be 
used to analyze system behavior by checking assertions (Rivera, 
2010).  Having the ability to quickly test a potential system change 
without needing specific system details streamlines the acquisition 
process while increasing the fidelity of the evaluation process.  
 The Use Case example demonstrates that MP supports the ability 
to generate and extract different views from an MP model.  The 
ability to provide stakeholders graphical representations of potential 
scenarios that may end in a hazard state is necessary.  
Additionally, because MP supports formal methods, testing using 
assertions has a high level of fidelity, given that the model does an 
exhaustive search for all counter-assertions within scope.  
MP provides the means to describe environmental behavior, which is why 
it was chosen as the modeling tool of choice for the “Eagle6 Prototype Software 
Architecture Modeling Software,” which is described later in this dissertation. 
E. PROTOTYPE NAVAL GUN WEAPON SYSTEM MODEL 
The gun weapon system model found in Appendix A is a model written 
entirely in MP.  It utilizes attributes in order to enable the evaluation of system 
properties. 
1. The Purpose of the Naval Gun Weapon System Model 
The design of the gun weapon system model is meant to satisfy the 
following two requirements: 
 Assertion-checking via an exhaustive generation of scenarios within 
scope. 





2. Introduction to the Model 
The gun weapon system model found in Appendix A is comprised of all 
system components identified in Chapter III.A, "Description of Naval Gun weapon 
system."  The model event begins with the R2D Radar identifying a target, and 
ends with a Gun Console Computer Open Fire command. 
3. Gun Weapon System Model Properties 
 Each system in the model has a root event that describes the 
system activity.  The following is a list of systems used in the gun weapon system 
model, with a list of included events that make up the ROOT activity.  Also 
included in each section are the test results for Scope, Total Scenarios, and the 
Total Processing Time.   
Scenario Generation Result Definitions: 
 Scope – Total scenarios generated from Eagle6 
 Total Scenarios – The total number of possible scenarios within the 
model scope. 
Processing Time – The amount of time it took for Eagle6 to generate an 
exhaustive search for all possible scenarios within scope. 
 
ROOT R2D_activity - the activity of AN/SPS-67 [R2D] - 2-D Surface Search 
Rotating Radar 
 R2D_displayNewTarget - R2D displays a new target on the screen 
MP Model: 
ROOT R2D_activity: {* 
            R2D_displayNewTarget // R2D displays a new target on the screen 
*}; 





Total Scenarios: 2 






Figure 22: Scenario Generated from MP Schema: Gun weapon system Model 
R2D_activity 
__________________________ 
ROOT CD_activity - the activity of C&D [CD] - Command and Decision.  
The software system that performs all functions within the Aegis combat system 
 CD_spotNewTarget - CD spots a new target on R2D screen 
 CD_ignoreTarget - CD ignores target 
 CD_request_GCC_setTarget - CD requests GCC to set target (requires 
more information about the target) 
 CD_wait_GCC_setTarget - CD waits for GCC to set target 
 CD_targetLost - CD loses target 
 CD_followTarget - CD follows target movements and waits to see what 
happens 
 CD_request_GCC_openFire - CD requests GCC to open fire at target 




ROOT CD_activity: {* CD_spotNewTarget *}; 
CD_spotNewTarget: ( // CD spots a new target and waits for R2D 
R2D_displayNewTarget // R2D displays a new target 
(CD_ignoreTarget // CD ignores target 




 CD_wait_GCC_setTarget // CD waits for GCC to set target 
((GCC_targetNotSet // GCC fails to set target 
CD_targetLost) |  
(GCC_targetSet // GCC sets the target and returns target info 
CD_followTarget // CD follows target and waits 
(CD_ignoreTarget // CD ignores target 
| (CD_request_GCC_openFire // CD requests GCC to open fire 
CD_wait_GCC_openFire // CD waits for GCC to open fire 
(GCC_openFireFailed // GCC failed to open fire 
| targetMissed // target is missed 
| targetHit))))))))); //target is hit 
//___________________________________________________ 






Total Scenarios: 7 






Figure 23: Scenario Generated from MP Schema: CD_activity Scenario #7 
__________________________ 
ROOT GCC_activity - The activity of Gun Console Computer [GCC]-Sub-
element of the GCS.  It interfaces with Aegis and other ship sensors and 
performs fire control calculations and provides data to the GMP 
 GCC_setTarget - GCC sets a target (waits for CD to request 
setTarget and returns target information) 
o GCC_targetNotSet - GCC fails to work 
o GCC_request_R3D_setTarget - GCC requests R3D to set 




o GCC_wait_R3D_setTarget - GCC waits for R3D to set 
target 
o GCC_targetSet - GCC sets the target and returns target info 
to R3D 
 GCC_openFire - GCC open fires on target (waits for CD to request 
openFire and opens fire) 
o GCC_openFireFailed - GCC is not working and it fails to 
open fire 
o GCC_request_GMP_openFire - GCC requests GMP to 
open fire 





Total Scenarios: 157 





Figure 24: Scenario Generated from MP Schema: GCC_activity Scenario #13 
__________________________ 
ROOT GMP_activity - the activity of Gun Mount Processor AN/UYK-44 
EP/OSM [GMP]-One sub-element of the GCS, which takes information from the 
GCC and provides services to the gun mount. 
o GMP_answerRequest_GCC_openFire - GMP answers request 
from GCC to open fire (waits for GCC to request openFire and 
requests the same to GMCP) 
o GMP_openFireFailed - GMP is not working and it fails to 
open fire 
o GMP_answerRequest_GMCP_ossData - GMP answers a 
request from GMCP for optical sight target data (it waits for a 
request and it sends data) 





 GMP_wait_CDC_ossData - GMP waits for CDC oss 
data 
 GMP_failReceiving_CDC_ossData - GMP does not 
receive oss data from CDC 
 GMP_receive_CDC_ossData - GMP receives oss 
data from CDC 
Model Results: 
Scope: 3 
Total Scenarios: 1885 













ROOT CDC_activity - the activity of Optical Sight System MK 46 Mod 1-
Control Display Console MK 132 Mod 0 [CDC]-The operator console used to 
control the MK46 Optical Sight 
 CDC_answerRequest_GMP_ossData - CDC answers the request 
from GMP for oss data (waits for GMP to request oss data and 
provides it) 
o CDC_request_EOD_ossData - CDC request EOD oss data 
(thermal and daylight) 
o CDC_wait_EOD_ossData - CDC waits for oss data from EOD 
o CDC_failReceiving_EOD_ossData - CDC does not receive 
oss data from EOD 
o CDC_receive_EOD_ossData - CDC receives oss data from 
EOD 
ROOT CDC_activity Model Results: 
Scope: 4 
Total Scenarios: 121 











ROOT EOD_activity-the activity of Optical Sight System MK 46 Mod 1-
Electro-Optic Director MK 85 Mod 1 [EOD]-The Optical Sight director system 
(installed above the bridge) that rotates and elevates per operator’s commands.  
The TV, IR, and laser rangefinder sensors are installed on the director, which 
points them in the right position 
 EOD_answerRequest_CDC_ossData - EOD answers the request 
from CDC of oss data (waits for CDC to request oss data and 
provides it) 
o EOD_requestDaylightSensorData - EOD requests data 
from daylight sensor 
o EOD_failGettingDaylightSensorData - EOD fails to get 
data from daylight sensor 
o EOD_receiveDaylightSensorData - EOD receives data 
from daylight sensor 
o EOD_requestThermalSensorData - EOD requests data 
from thermal sensor 
o EOD_failGettingThermalSensorData - EOD fails to get 
data from thermal sensor 
o EOD_receiveThermalSensorData - EOD receives data 
from thermal sensor 
 
ROOT EOD_activity Model Results: 
Scope: 5 
Total Scenarios: 1365 






Figure 27: Scenario Generated from MP Schema: EOD_activity Scenario #13 
__________________________ 
ROOT GMCP_activity-the activity of Gun Mount Control Panel MK 437 
Mod 1 [GMCP]-Backup Operator's console installed below the gun mount.  It is 
used in case the main ADS console in the combat information center goes down 
o GMCP_answerFireRequest - GMCP answers a fire request when 
displayed on screen (waits for a fire request to be displayed on the 
screen and it starts fire procedures) 
o GMCP_displayOpenFireRequest - GMCP displays an 
open fire request on screen 




o GMCP_request_GMP_ossData - GMCP requests optical 
sight system target data from GMP 
o GMCP_wait_GMP_ossData - GMCP waits for optical sight 
system data from GMP 
o GMCP_failReceiving_GMP_ossData - GMCP does not 
receive oss target data from GMP 
o GMCP_receive_GMP_ossData - GMCP receives optical 
sight system data 
o GMCP_send_GM_openFireCommand - GMCP sends GM 
an open fire command 
o GMCP_wait_GM_openFireCommand - GMCP waits for 
GM to open fire 
 
ROOT GMCP_activity Model Results: 
Scope: 5 
Total Scenarios: 1365 












ROOT GM_activity-the activity of Gun Mount EX 45 Mod 4 [GM]-The 5” 
gun mount.  Holds 20 rounds in the drum and fires 18-20 rounds per minute. 
o GM_answer_GMCP_openFireCommand - waits for GMCP to send 
an open fire command and it opens fire 
o GM_launchMissile - GM launches a missile 
o GM_waitForMissileToHit - GM waits for the missile to hit 
the enemy target 
o targetHit - target is hit 
o targetMissed - target is missed 
 
ROOT GM_activity Model Results: 
Scope: 9 
Total Scenarios: 1023 











ROOT R3D_activity-the activity of AN/SPY-1D [R3D]-3-D Air Defense 
and Surface Search Phased Array Radar 
o R3D_setTarget - R3D sets target on radar (it waits for GCC to 
request and returns additional information about target) 
o R3D_targetNotSet - R3D manages to set target 
o R3D_targetSet - R3D fails to set target 
 
Code: 
ROOT R3D_activity: {*R3D_setTarget*}; // R3D sets a target 
R3D_targetNotSet, R3D_targetSet; 
R3D_setTarget: ( // R3D sets target and waits 
GCC_request_R3D_setTarget // waits for GCC response 
              (R3D_targetNotSet // R3D manages to set target 
                         | R3D_targetSet ));// R3D fails to set target 
___________________________________________________ 




ROOT R3D_activity Model Results: 
Scope: 9 
Total Scenarios: 1023 










a. Explanation of Event Attributes 
There are two types of attributes: static and dynamic.  Static 
attributes are values that are set at the beginning of a model and do not change.  
Dynamic attributes have a value that may change in different parts of the 
scenario.  The Eagle6 prototype uses static attributes that enable query 
language.  Dynamic attributes are reserved for future research.  For more details 
on Dynamic attributes, see (Auguston & Whitcomb, System architecture 
specification based on behavior models, 2010). 
 
 Environmental Behavior 
 Events and schemas are used to model environmental 
behavior in the same way we model system behavior.  Attributes are properties 
of events.  For example, the following attribute 
"Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd" is used to measure the total number of 
manual approvals required to execute an event.  The environmental behavior is 
the manual approval, such that the system and the environment both share the 
event.  The following attributes are used within the gun weapon system model: 
 Max_Watts - A numeric value of the amount of Watts required to 
execute the event.  The default value is 0. 
 Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB - Amount of network bandwidth 
required to transmit the event response.  The measurement for this 
attribute is MB, and the default value is 0. 
 Total_Processing_Time_Sec - Total time required for the event to 
elapse.  The measurement for this attribute is seconds, and the 
default value is 0. 
 Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd - Total number of manual 






find scenarios where the number of manual approvals required to 
process an OpenFire command exceeds the acceptable limit.  The 




Table 6: Gun Weapon System Model Events and Attributes 
R2D_displayNewTarget: <Max_Watts=90, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.5, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
CD_request_GCC_setTarget: <Max_Watts=120, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
CD_wait_GCC_setTarget: <Max_Watts=10, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.1, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
GCC_request_R3D_setTarget: <Max_Watts=100, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
GCC_wait_R3D_setTarget: <Max_Watts=8, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.1, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
R3D_targetSet: <Max_Watts=120, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=2.0, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
GCC_targetSet: <Max_Watts=120, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=2.0, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
CD_followTarget: <Max_Watts=160, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=4.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=0.5, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> 
; 
CD_request_GCC_openFire: <Max_Watts=60, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=0.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=2> ; 
CD_wait_GCC_openFire: <Max_Watts=5, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.2, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=2>; 
GCC_request_GMP_openFire: <Max_Watts=60, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=0.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=2> ; 
GCC_wait_GMP_openFire: <Max_Watts=5, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.3, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=2>; 
GMCP_displayOpenFireRequest: <Max_Watts=140, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=0> ; 
GMCP_request_GMP_ossData: <Max_Watts=100, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.5, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=2.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
GMP_request_CDC_ossData: <Max_Watts=100, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
GMP_wait_CDC_ossData: <Max_Watts=50, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.5, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
CDC_request_EOD_ossData: <Max_Watts=110, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
CDC_wait_EOD_ossData: <Max_Watts=100, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
EOD_requestDaylightSensorData: <Max_Watts=80, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 





EOD_requestThermalSensorData: <Max_Watts=80, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
EOD_receiveThermalSensorData: <Max_Watts=120, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=3.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=2.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
CDC_receive_EOD_ossData: <Max_Watts=150, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=3.5, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=3.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
GMP_receive_CDC_ossData: <Max_Watts=120, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.5, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=2.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
GMCP_receive_GMP_ossData: <Max_Watts=120, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.5, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
GMCP_wait_GMP_ossData: <Max_Watts=10, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.5, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
GMCP_send_GM_openFireCommand: <Max_Watts=100, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=2> ; 
GMCP_wait_GM_openFireCommand: <Max_Watts=10, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.5, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=2>; 
GM_launchMissile: <Max_Watts=250, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=2.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=2> ; 






4. Testing Architectural Design Via Formal Queries 
Identifying unintended system behavior is paramount when executing a 
software system safety assessment.   
The concept “Chain” is defined as a set of events with the property that 
any two events from the chain (x and y) have a PRECEDES relationship between 
them (either x PRECEDES y, or y PRECEDES x).  The set that contains all 
Chains of scenario s is described as Chain(s).  Given a scenario s, we define A 
as a chain of s as: 
 
The formal design of these models creates a framework for system 
behavior properties to be expressed as computations over event traces.  Eagle6 
uses the MP framework and therefore supports extracting different views from 
the model, and verification of behavior properties within a given scope. 
Advantages of this approach compared with the common simulation tools are as 
follows: 
 Means to write assertions about the system behavior and tools to verify 
those assertions. 
 Exhaustive search through all possible scenarios (up to the scope limit). 
 The support for verifiable refinement of the architecture model, up to 
design and implementation models. 
 Integration of the architecture models with environment models for 
defining typical scenarios (use cases) and verifying system’s behavior for 
those scenarios. 
The application of the gun weapon system model has the following two 
major functions: (1) testing the gun weapon system architectural design; and (2) 
generating random scenarios according to predefined probabilities with the 




a. Testing Architectural Design Via Formal Queries 
The result of executing an MP model is a set of valid event traces 
(scenarios): 
 
Figure 31: MP Model Scenario Generation Process 
 
The following query language represents how the user obtains a 
set of scenarios by constructing dynamic queries via the Eagle6 user interface: 
 
 
Figure 32: Query Building Process 
Eagle6 has a graphical interface that enables the user to create 
queries. The graphical interface has three types of queries available in 
parameterized form as macro commands that can be used individually, or 
combined for a more refined ResultSet: 
b. Macro Commands 
Query type 1: EventCount 
EventCount is used to return only scenarios that have a min/max 
number of total events within the scenario.  The EventCount Macro Command 




EventCount(EventType, Operator, Value) 
Parameters required:  
 EventType – a valid event type from the MP model 
 Operator – one of the following:   
 Value – numerical value 
Notation:  
   
 
Example:  
The following macro command returns all scenarios that have > 1 
events of type GCC_openFireFailed: 
ResultSet = EventCount(GCC_openFireFailed, >=, 1) 
Query type 2: SliceSum 
SliceSum is used to return only scenarios that have a min/max 
number of total events that happen in parallel within the scenario.  The SliceSum 
Macro Command has the following structure: 
 
SliceSum(AttributeName, Operator, Value) 
Parameters required:  
 AttributeName – a valid attribute name from the MP model 
 Operator – one of the following: <, <=, =, >, >= 








The following query returns all scenarios that have at least one 
Slice of events where the attribute MaxWatts aggregate sum > 220: 
 
SliceSum(MaxWatts, >=, 220) 
 
Query type 3: ChainSum 
ChainSum is used to return only scenarios with events that happen 
in sequence and also have attribute properties that meet the query definition.  
The ChainSum Macro Command has the following structure: 
 
ChainSum(AttributeName, Operator, Value) 
Parameters required:  
 AttributeName – a valid attribute name from the MP model 
 Operator – one of the following:   
 Value – numerical value 





The following query returns all scenarios that have at least one 
chain of events that has an aggregate sum of the attribute 





ChainSum(Total_Processing_Time_Sec, >=, 5)  
 
Query type 4: Combined Query 
 The Eagle6 interface has the ability to create combined queries.  
The ResultSet is generated from a combination of the predefined macro 
commands 1-3: 
ResultSet = MacroCommand1 ∩ MacroCommand2  
 
The intersection of sets MacroCommand1 and MacroCommand2 is 
the set of all elements of MacroCommand1 which are also elements of 
MacroCommand2. 
Example:  
The example represents a query that combines the Queries 1-3, 
and returns scenarios that meet the all of the queries' criteria: 
Minimum of one scenario where the GCC_openFireFailed event 
Count >= 1 AND a minimum of one scenario where parallel events that have the 
attribute MaxWatts have an aggregate sum >=220. 
 
ResultSet = {(EventCount(GCC_openFireFailed, >=, 1)) ∩
 (SliceSum(MaxWatts, >=, 220))} 
 
F. IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL SOFTWARE SAFETY HAZARD STATES 
When modeling the naval gun weapon system (Appendix A), we use both 
exhaustive and random scenario generation to evaluate software safety.  
Appendix B contains the Gun weapon system Assertion Library.  The Exhaustive 
Search is the process of generating all possible scenarios from the MP model up 
to a given scope.  The exhaustive search enables the user to find scenarios that 




generate estimates that are used for software safety assessment.  Eagle6 
generates random scenarios within scope to calculate statistical estimates. 
 
Exhaustive Search 
The exhaustive search method enables the user to input query criteria that 
customizes the result set returned by the software.  Limiting result sets to 
important scenarios enables users to see only the data in which they are 
interested.  
1. Modeling Demonstration: QUERY GWSMaxWatts 
Hazard State: Find scenarios where the gun weapon system may require 
more Watts than the gun weapon system can produce. 
 
Test Definition:  Return all scenarios within scope that have at least one 
Slice that contains events that have the attribute MaxWatts, and the sum of the 
attribute MaxWatts  is >= 220. 
 
Macro Command: 










Figure 34: QUERY GWSMaxWatts - Results 
 
The graphic contains the following information: 
o Graphic Display - A hyperlink that is programmed to display the 




o Total Event Count - The total number of events that are included in 
the scenario. 
o SliceSum(Max_Watts) for parallel events - The column is used to 
display scenario details that evaluate attributes.  The "Show 
Details" button displays the individual events and their 
corresponding attribute values.  The background color orange is 
used to alert the user that one or more events do not have an 
attribute value assigned.  The textual output value for attribute 
values that are null is empty.  The color green is used to alert the 










The following graph represents a close-up view of the events that are 
identified in the SliceSum Query:  
 






Summary: The Software Safety Hazard State description ““Find scenarios 
where the gun weapon system may require more power than the gun weapon 
system can produce”” resulted in the test scenario containing the Macro Query 
SliceSum(MaxWatts, >=, 220). The query demonstration showed the query 
returned five  possible scenarios where the gun weapon system could result in a 
Hazard State.  The following is a list of events contained in the slice (that 
satisfied the query) from the scenario:  
  
The slice from the scenario contains the following events:  
Events (Sum of MaxWatts = 290) 
 CD_wait_GCC_openFire(10).MaxWatts =5  
 GCC_wait_GMP_openFire(22).MaxWatts =5  
 GMCP_wait_GMP_ossData(29).MaxWatts =10  
 GMP_wait_CDC_ossData(36).MaxWatts =50  
 CDC_wait_EOD_ossData(41).MaxWatts =100  
 EOD_receiveDaylightSensorData(46).MaxWatts =120 
 
2. Modeling Demonstration: QUERY Network_Capacity_Check 
Hazard State: Find scenarios where the gun weapon system may require 
more network bandwidth than the gun weapon system network can provide. 
Test Description: Find a set of scenarios that have at least one slice with 
the following property: the sum of the attribute Max_Network_Bandwidth for all 
events that belong to that slice must be >= five . 
Macro Command: 
SliceSum(Max_Network_Bandwidth, >=, 5)  





Figure 37: QUERY Network_Capacity_Check - Scenario Query 
 
 











Summary: The Software Safety Hazard State description “Find scenarios 
where the gun weapon system may require more network bandwidth than the 
gun weapon system network can provide” resulted in the test scenario containing 
the Macro Query SliceSum(Max_Network_Bandwidth, >=, 5). The query 
demonstration showed the query returned four possible scenarios where the gun 
weapon system network could result in a Hazard State.  The following is a list of 
events contained in the slice (that satisfied the query) from the scenario: 
 
Events (Sum of Max_Network_Bandwidth_MB: 5.5)  
 CD_wait_GCC_openFire(10).Max_Network_Bandwidth_MB =0.2  
 GCC_wait_GMP_openFire(22).Max_Network_Bandwidth_MB =0.3  
 GMCP_wait_GMP_ossData(31).Max_Network_Bandwidth_MB 
=0.5  
 GMP_wait_CDC_ossData(39).Max_Network_Bandwidth_MB =0.5  
 CDC_wait_EOD_ossData(44).Max_Network_Bandwidth_MB =1  
 EOD_receiveDaylightSensorData(49).Max_Network_Bandwidth_M
B =3 
3. Model Demonstration: QUERY GCC_OpenFireFail  
Hazard State: Find scenarios where the gun weapon system may 
experience the failure of a Gun Control Center Open Fire Command. 
Test Definition: Find a set of possible hazard state scenarios where the 
CGG_openFire event happens at least once.  
Macro Command: 






Figure 40: QUERY GCC_OpenFireFail - Scenario Query 
 





Figure 42: Scenario Generated from QUERY GCC_OpenFireFail - Graphical 
Display 
 
Summary: The Software Safety Hazard State description “Find scenarios 
where the gun weapon system may experience the failure of a Gun Control 
Center Open Fire Command” resulted in the test scenario containing the Macro 
Query EventCount(GCC_openFireFailed, >=, 1). The query demonstration 
showed the query returned nine possible scenarios where the gun weapon 






4. Model Demonstration: QUERY Max_Manual_Approvals 
Hazard State: Find scenarios where gun weapon system design may 
result in the gun weapon system requiring >= three manual approvals to execute 
an Open Fire Command. 
 
Test Description: Find a set of scenarios that contain at least one 
GCC_openFire event, and also have at least one slice of events that have the 
Attribute Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd with a sum that is >= 3. 
 
Macro Command: 























Figure 45: Scenario Generated from QUERY Max_Manual_Approvals - 
Graphical Display 
Summary:  
The Software Safety Hazard State description “Find scenarios where gun 
weapon system design may result in the gun weapon system requiring >= three 
manual approvals to execute an Open Fire Command” resulted in the test 
scenario containing the Macro Query: 







The query demonstration showed the query returned ten possible 
scenarios where the gun weapon system could result in a Hazard State.  The 
following is a list of events contained in the slice (that satisfied the query) from 
the scenario: 
 
Events (Sum of Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd: 8)  




For_Cmd =2  
 GM_launchMissile(51).Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd =2  
 
5. Model Demonstration: QUERY GCC_ OpenFireFailed 
Hazard State: Find scenarios where Gun Console Computer tries to 
execute an Open Fire Command and it ends with a system timeout. 
Description: Find a set of scenarios that contain the GCC_openFire 
event, and also have at least one chain of events with a sum of the attribute 
Total_Processing_Time_Sec that is >= five . 
Macro Command: 
ResultSet = {(EventCount(GCC_openFire, >=, 1)) 
































Figure 48: GCC_OpenFire Total Processing - Graphical Display 
Summary: The Software Safety Hazard State description “Find scenarios 
where Gun Console Computer tries to execute an Open Fire Command and it 
ends with a system timeout” resulted in the test scenario containing the Macro 
Query: 
{(EventCount(GCC_openFire, >=, )) 
(ChainSum(Total_Processing_Time_Sec,>=, 5))}; 
The query demonstration showed the query returned 11 possible 
scenarios where the gun weapon system could result in a Hazard State.  The 







Events (SUM of Total_Processing_Time_Sec: 8.5 Seconds) 
 R2D_displayNewTarget(2).Total_Processing_Time_Sec =1.5  
 CD_request_GCC_setTarget(5).Total_Processing_Time_Sec =1  
 GCC_targetSet(7).Total_Processing_Time_Sec =2  
 CD_followTarget(8).Total_Processing_Time_Sec =0.5  
 CD_request_GCC_openFire(9).Total_Processing_Time_Sec =0.5  
 CD_wait_GCC_openFire(10).Total_Processing_Time_Sec = 
Attribute Value Not Assigned 
 GCC_openFireFailed(11).Total_Processing_Time_Sec = Attribute 
Value Not Assigned 
 GCC_request_R3D_setTarget(14).Total_Processing_Time_Sec =1  
 GCC_wait_R3D_setTarget(15).Total_Processing_Time_Sec = 
Attribute Value Not Assigned 
 R3D_targetSet(16).Total_Processing_Time_Sec =2 
G. USING PROBABILITIES TO REFINE SYSTEM BEHAVIOR IN MP  
Inserting event probabilities is designed to give the modeler a more 
refined capability of modeling actual system behavior.  Introducing event 
probabilities may be used to estimate the probability of a Hazard State, as well 
as the probability of an Software Safety assertion. 
Eagle6 uses the Monte Carlo method of approximating an expectation by 
the sample mean of a function of simulated random variables within the model 
scope 
The following iterative scenario generation process, and random scenario 
generation process require a larger scope in order to generate statistical results 




 Iterative Scenario Generation - A process that uses the Markov 
Chain theory such that the ResultSet consists of a finite number of 
states (scope) and some known probabilities p, where pij is the 
probability of moving from state i to state j. This approach enables 
the user to generate scenarios that produce counter-examples of 
assertions, as well as the probabilities of those assertions. 
 Random Scenario Generation - Generates random scenarios within 
scope to calculate statistical estimates.  The purpose of this 
functionality is to create estimates that are used for software safety 
assessments.  
To determine probabilities of a scenario, event attributes are assigned a 
probability value: 
 (* <0-n/a0,a1,a2,a3 ...  an> Radar_Target_Identified *) 
The notation represents an a0 probability that Radar_Target_Identified 
appears zero times, an a1 probability that Radar_Target_Identified appears one 
time ...  an an probability that Radar_Target_Identified appears n times. 
 
Given a specified range for scope, the typical expression: 
(* <n1-n2> Radar_Target_Identified *) 
Becomes: 
(* <n1-n2/a0,a1,a2,a3 ...  an2-n1> Radar_Target_Identified *) 
There is an a0 probability that Radar_Target_Identified appears n1 times, 
an a1 probability that Radar_Target_Identified appears (n1+1) times...  an an2-n1 







Eagle6 Exhaustive Scenario Generation 
The following graphic represents the Eagle6 exhaustive scenario 
generation user interface options page.  The options page has the ability to refine 
the application output by setting parameters for three general options: 
 
 
Figure 49: Exhaustive Scenario Generation Options 
The following model demonstrates how to set the probability of an event.  
In the following test, it was determined that the event Radar_Target_Identified 
had two possible outcomes: Enemy_Target and Friendly_Target.  To better 
model the operational environment, the modeler assigned the probability of an 
Enemy_Target being identified 60% more often than a Friendly_Target.  
 
EXHAUSTIVE GENERATION DEMONSTRATION: 
Consider the following Model: 
ROOT Radar_Target_Identified: ( 
(Enemy_Target | Friendly_Target)  




(* <1-3> Target_Ready_For_Fire *)); 
Set following probabilities: 
 60% probability of event Enemy_Target happening instead of event 
Friendly_Target 
 33.3% probability of events In_Weapon_Range and Target_Lock to 
appear  
 20% probability of event Target_Ready_For_Fire to appear one 
time 
 30% probability of event Target_Ready_For_Fire to appear two 
times 
 50% probability of event Target_Ready_For_Fire to appear three 
times 
The following model represents the system modeling requirements: 
ROOT Radar_Target_Identified: ( 
(Enemy_Target | <0.40> Friendly_Target)  
[<0.33> (In_Weapon_Range Target_Lock)]  
(*<1-3/0.20,0.30,0.50> Target_Ready_For_Fire *)); 
 
The following filter was applied to the Radar_Target_Identified model: 
 





The graphic displays the probability of all possible scenarios using the 
exhaustive scenario generation approach.   
 
Figure 51: Model Results Showing Probability 
 
Note: If the user selects query criteria on the options page, the result set 
may contain probability values for scenarios that do not total 100%.  This is due 
to possible scenarios having been filtered from the final result set: 
 




The results of the Radar_Target_Identified event, after applying the filter, 
were a record set of six possible scenarios, with a probability of 33% that one of 
the six events will occur. 
 
RANDOM GENERATION DEMONSTRATION 
The model is an exact copy of the model used in the exhaustive scenario 
generation method demonstrated: 
 
Consider the following Model: 
ROOT Radar_Target_Identified: ( 
(Enemy_Target | Friendly_Target)  
[(In_Weapon_Range Target_Lock)]  
(* <1-3> Target_Ready_For_Fire *)); 
 
Set following probabilities: 
 60% probability of event Enemy_Target happening instead of event 
Friendly_Target 
 33.3% probability of events In_Weapon_Range and Target_Lock to 
appear  
 20% probability of event Target_Ready_For_Fire to appear one 
time 
 30% probability of event Target_Ready_For_Fire to appear two 
times 






The following model represents the system modeling requirements: 
ROOT Radar_Target_Identified: ( 
(Enemy_Target | <0.40> Friendly_Target)  
[<0.33> (In_Weapon_Range Target_Lock)]  
(*<1-3/0.20,0.30,0.50> Target_Ready_For_Fire *)); 
 
 Demonstration: 
To generate random scenario generation, the user must select the 
"Random Scenario Generation" link at the top of the options page: 
 
 
Figure 53: Random Scenario Generation Options 
Model Results 
In the following graphic, Eagle6 displays how many times each scenario 
was generated and the probability for each scenario (calculated using the total 





Figure 54: Model Results Showing Probability for 1000 Generated Scenarios 
 
H. DEMONSTRATION SUMMARY 
The demonstrations 1-5 show how the Eagle6 application may improve 
the current method in which the SSSTRP executes Software Safety 
assessments.  Demonstrations six and seven demonstrate the ability for Eagle6 
to test functional requirements, which is also a part of the SSSTRP process.  The 
following Hazard State conditions were created to demonstrate the application of 
Eagle6 to the Software Safety domain, with specific applicability to the SSSTRP 
process: 
 Find scenarios where the gun weapon system may require more 
watts than the gun weapon system can produce. 
 Find scenarios where the gun weapon system may require more 
network bandwidth than the gun weapon system network can 
provide. 
 Find scenarios where the gun weapon system may experience the 




 Find a set of scenarios that contain at least one GCC_openFire 
event, and also have at least one slice of events that have the 
Attribute Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd with a sum that is >= 
3. 
 Find scenarios where Gun Console Computer tries to execute an 
Open Fire Command and it ends with a system timeout. 
The demonstrations 1-5 show how the system and environment can be 
modeled with specific focus on the ability to model system behavior.  This 
capability is especially helpful in the SSSTRP software safety domain as the 
need exists to not only check for potential software hazard states, but also create 
domain models that enable the testing of potential software with realistic 
environmental events,  and the probabilities associated with those events.  This 
approach is much more refined and allows for domain models to better reflect the 
operational behavior in which the systems function.  With a methodology for 
modeling system behavior, and an ability to generate estimates for both 
functional and nonfunctional requirements, the next step is to identify how the 
proposed methodology can be integrated into the SSSTRP process. 
I. PROTOTYPE SSSTRP EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
The prototype SSSTRP evaluation methodology is based on the research 
of the current SSSTRP process (Chapter I), the problems associated with the 
SSSTRP evaluation process (Chapter II), and Eagle6 capabilities that are 
demonstrated in Chapter III).  The prototype has not been tested, but is included 
in this research based on the relevance to the domain.  The purpose of the 
prototype SSSTRP evaluation methodology is to recommend changes to the 
current SSSTRP process that includes the integration of our modeling 
methodology, as well as a more definitive evaluation process. 
Our research demonstrates that Eagle6 was able to provide the ability to 
model potential systems and how they interact with their environment.  The 




the SSSTRP process.  The prototype SSSTRP evaluation methodology is 
recommended for integrating a standardized methodology for automating system 
testing.   
The solution to model a gun weapon system and to have the ability to test 
for software safety assertions was addressed in Chapter III.  The Prototype 
SSSTRP Evaluation Methodology is designed to obtain the functional and 
nonfunctional requirements of a system before the acquisition community has 
released the RFP.  This change in process allows for the development of a TDP 
questionnaire that is designed to elicit responses that can be entered into a 
model and evaluated.  The SSSTRP Evaluation Methodology has five major 
components: 
Step 1: Develop Domain Model 
Purpose: To develop a domain model of the current system.   
 
Expected Benefits: The MP model enables the SSSTRP to model the 
current system state in order to evaluate proposed changes to the system. 
Artifacts: 
 MP Model 
 List of Hazard States 
 Assertion Library 
 Functional Requirements 
 Nonfunctional Requirements 
Step 2: Develop Vendor Questionnaire 
Purpose: The Vendor Questionnaire is designed to elicit responses to 
questions about system behavior.  Formatting the Vendor Questionnaire in such 
a way that requires the vendor to respond with measurable answers enables the 




Expected Benefits: MP does not require specific knowledge of systems 
in order to model a system.  This abstract approach to SoS modeling supports a 
vendor questionnaire structure that is designed to elicit answers that reflect the 
compatibility of the proposed system relative to the current operational 
environment.   
Artifacts: 
Vendor Questionnaire 
Step 3: Organize Vendor TDP Response 
Purpose: Organizing the Vendor TDP response requires the TDP 
answers to be formatted in a standardized way that can be input into the domain 
model.   
Expected Benefits: Standardizing the TDP response into data that can 
be automatically read into a domain model reduces risk of human error and 
standardizes the results that are output by the model.   
Artifacts: 
TDP Model Input Files 
 
Step 4: Formally Evaluate Software 
Purpose: To execute test plan and generate results in graphical and 
textual formats.  The results of the tests are formatted and given to the SSSTRP 
for evaluation. 
Expected Benefits: Executing standardized test plans enables the 
SSSTRP to evaluate the results by generating the following reports: 
 Comparison Analysis - Compares the system side-by-side to create 
an evaluation of the proposed systems in a consolidated format. 
  Assertion Checking Reports - Reports that identify system 




 Functional and Nonfunctional System Performance Reports -   
Reports that show how the system may perform when integrated as 
part of an overall SoS.  
Artifacts: 
 Comparison Analysis 
 Assertion-Checking Reports 
 Functional System Performance Reports 
 Nonfunctional System Performance Reports 
 
Step 5: Conduct SSSTRP Review 
The SSSTRP reviews the results of the tests and requests additional tests 
if needed.  SSSTRP findings, reports, and recommendations are then forwarded 











Providing the SSSTRP community with high-level models that may satisfy 
a portion of the software safety assessment process improves the current 
inspection-based evaluation methodology.  Without a high-level modeling 
process, the alternative is to implement the system and to perform testing.  
Manual testing is a very expensive and timely alternative, which may be partially 
satisfied using the prototype methodology and tools that are covered in this 
chapter. 
The Prototype SSSTRP Evaluation Methodology is designed to obtain the 
functional and nonfunctional requirements of a system before the acquisition 
community has released the RFP.  This change in process allows for the 
development of a TDP questionnaire that is designed to elicit responses that can 
be entered into a model and evaluated.  The revised SSSTRP process includes 
artifacts that supports a more structured evaluation process.  
K. LIMITATIONS OF THE PROTOTYPE SSSTRP PROCESS 
The proposed revised SSSTRP process introduces the results of this 
research into the current SSSTRP process while adding artifacts within each 
evaluation stage.  The proposed changes to the SSSTRP process have not been 









IV. EAGLE6–PROTOTYPE SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE 
MODELING SOFTWARE 
The need for graphical representation of system models required 
automated tools to compile and display traces of model execution in textual and 
graphical formats.  The demonstration of Eagle6 for naval gun weapon system 
software was achieved by developing custom software with the following 
components.   
 Custom software (compiler/lexer/parser) to process MP models. 
 Custom software that displays the MP model in textual and 
graphical formats. 
 Dynamic Query interface that enables the user to return a set of 
scenarios based on an iterative or random scenario generation 
approach.  These approaches are described later in this section.  
The MP model used to demonstrate the modeling software can be found 
in Appendix A.  
The Eagle6 application was designed and built with programming help 
from Alex Gociu.   
A. EAGLE6 PROTOTYPE SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE 
Eagle6 modeling software consists of the following functionality: 
 Parse and validate modeling language 
 Generate all possible scenarios within scope 
 Build dynamic queries 
 Display scenarios graphically 
 Export scenarios to text 





Figure 56: Eagle6 Prototype Software Architecture 
The Eagle6 Prototype Software diagram model represents the Eagle6 
system architecture.   










C. MP MODEL OF INTERACTION BETWEEN EAGLE6 AND USER 
The following MP model demonstrates the ability to model system design 
as demonstrated in the "Eagle6 User Experience Model." 
 
ROOT User_activity: ( 
 StartModeling 
 (* 
  DevelopModelCode 
  SendModelCodeToParser 
  ( 
   ( 
    SendErrorsToUser 
    ReadModelCodeErrors 
   ) 
   | ( 
    SendAstToUser 
    FormatModelAst 
    ReviewModel 
    ( 
     RejectModel 
     | ( 
      AcceptModel 
      (* 
       SetFilters 
       FormatModelFilters 
       SendModelToCompiler 
       SendScenariosToUser 
       ReadScenarios 
      *) 
     ) 
    ) 
   ) 









  ( 
   ModelCodeHasErrors 
   SendErrorsToUser 
  ) 
  | (  
   ModelCodeHasNoErrors 
   GenerateAst 
   SendAstToUser 















Parser_activity, User_activity SHARE ALL SendModelCodeToParser, SendErrorsToUser, 
SendAstToUser; 









The Eagle6 MP Architecture Scenario represents the Eagle6 system 
architecture.  MP has the capability to quickly modify existing schemas to be 
used in future system architecture verification.   
D. PROTOTYPE COMPILER ARCHITECTURE 
The system has four major components: 
 User Interface (located on web server) 
 Model Compiler (located on web server) 
 Model Parser (java applet) 
 Model Viewer (java applet) 
 
1. Eagle6 Compiler Design 
The Prototype Model Compiler is built in C++ and is located on a web 
server.  The compiler has the following functionality: 
 Interact with the User 
o Provide HTML graphical interface for the user 
o Provide model parser and viewer Java applets 
o Get abstract syntax tree from model 
o Provide and get simulation options 
o Provide scenarios list 
o Export scenarios to different formats 
 Interact with the Eagle6 Model Compiler  
o Send model program and simulation options 




2. Eagle6 Lexer and Parser 
The Eagle6 Model Parser provides the functions of a lexer and parser for 
the MP language (Auguston, Software architecture built from behavior models, 
2009).  The Eagle6 Model Parser receives user input representing an MP model, 
validates the code, returns syntax error information (if applicable), and builds the 




Figure 59: Prototype MP Editor 
E. EAGLE6 PROTOTYPE PARSER AND HELPER 
The “Parse Code” button executes the MP Model Code Parser that checks 
for syntax errors in the model.  If the model structure is incorrect, an error 
message is displayed that identifies the specifics of the error.  The following is an 






Figure 60: Eagle6 Prototype Parser Error Handling 
If the code is parsed successfully, the user is presented with a page that 
allows the user to further define the criteria for generating scenarios. 
F. EAGLE6 PROTOTYPE VIEWER FOR GRAPHICAL AND TEXTUAL 
DISPLAY OF SCENARIO 
The Eagle6 Prototype Viewer is built in Java and is a Java applet with 
JGraph being the application used for graphical representation of the model.  The 
scenario generation options page allows for models to be generated and tested 
with a full degree of fidelity using the detail display options. 
1. Eagle6 Prototype Viewer General Options 
The scenario generation options page is used to set the parameters of 
your test.  This page has the following characteristics: (1) The general options of 
your test can be set to include the expansion scope and the level of details 
returned from the compiler; and (2) scenario filter conditions represent dynamic 
queries that are used to set filtering parameters, so the results returned by the 





Figure 61: Eagle6 Prototype Viewer Scenario Generator 
Default Expansion Scope – The purpose of the default expansion scope 
is to limit the size of the "*" rule in order to better define the scenario’s 
parameters.  For example, if the test scenario requires the gun weapon system to 
fire three rounds, the scenario’s scope is set to “3,” thereby removing the infinite 
(“*”) default parameter.  In the absence of an expansion scope, setting this value 
will result in a finite number of scenarios.   
Display x scenarios – Defines the total number of scenarios to be 
displayed.   
Display starting scenario no. – Displays scenarios starting at a specific 
number.  The option of generating a list starting at a specific number allows for a 





2. Eagle6 Prototype Viewer Scenario Generation Filter 
In order to refine the models returned from the compiler, it is necessary to 
refine the data inputs that are used by the compiler in order to filter scenario 
results.  Eagle6 uses a dynamic query builder to satisfy this requirement, as 
shown in the event count conditions function: 
 
Figure 62: Eagle6 Prototype Viewer Scenario Generator Filter 
EventCount (event count) – Enables the user to refine the results returned 
from the compiler by limiting the results to scenarios that have a specific event, 
and event count condition. 
 Event – Event is used to select a specific event that is supplied to 
the dynamic query builder.   
 Operator – Sets the evaluation parameters for the query builder.  
Values are: "<", "<=", ", "=", ">", ">=" 





SliceSum (maximum slice sum) – SliceSum is used to find scenarios that 
contain events that run in parallel and have attribute values that, when summed, 
meet the query builder criteria. 
 Attribute – User-defined event attribute that is identified in the 
system model. 
 Operator – Sets the evaluation parameters for the query builder.  
Values are: "<", "<=", ", "=", ">", ">=" 
 Value – Value sets the specific event count parameters used by the 
query builder. 
ChainSum – ChainSum is used to find scenarios that contain events that 
run in sequence and have attribute values that, when summed, meet the query 
builder criteria. 
 Attribute – User-defined event attribute that is identified in the 
system model. 
 Operator – Sets the evaluation parameters for the query builder.  
Values are: "<", "<=", ", "=", ">", ">=" 




The program will calculate all possible scenarios within scope, and display 





Figure 63: Eagle6 Prototype View Scenario Generator Result 
The results of the test were five  possible scenarios.  Using the “Show 
Details” function, the number of events and number of relationships from each 
scenario are also displayed.  The scenario test can be viewed by the string or 
graphical display options. 
The Eagle6 Prototype Viewer is used for displaying scenarios in graphical 
representation.  Events are the vertices and the IN/PRECEDES relations 
between them, noted by arrows. 
Using the graphical interface, the user is able to filter event views.  For 






Figure 64: Eagle6 Prototype Viewer Filter Functionality 
The result of the filter interface is the hiding of all unselected events, which 
allows for a more readable graphic display of the scenario. 
G. LIMITATION OF EAGLE6 TOOL 
The Eagle6 tool is considered a prototype and has not been tested using 
multiple case studies and test tools.  The tool has the following limitations: 
 Tool Verification – The tool does not have the capability to formally 
verify the MP model represents the current software system 
architecture.  Inspection techniques that compare system behavior 
with scenarios that are generated from custom queries are the 
current method for verifying models.  However, it seems logical that 
log tools that run in the system architecture can be extracted and 




identified as future work, and is on the development plan for an 
Eagle6 future version. 
 Determining the “Right” Scope – Determining the proper scope that 
meets the criteria for returning the maximum amount of assertion 
violations is largely dependent upon the complexity and purpose of 
the model.  We cannot guarantee that the Small Scope Hypothesis 
will detect a majority of errors.  However, given the current state of 
the SSSTRP evaluation process that uses inspection techniques 
with arbitrary test cases, the use of a tool that can test hundreds of 
scenarios is an improvement of the current software safety 
evaluation process.  A proper scope is dependent upon the 
situation and the relative risk.  Future work is required to estimate 
the proper scope. 
 Complex Scope Computing – Enterprise models that have 
exponential possibilities of scenarios result in a risk of the 
computing power not being able to produce an acceptable number 
of scenarios with the Small Scope. 
 Abstraction Layer Definitions – The tool does not have the ability to 
standardize the layers of abstraction.  However, the tool does give 
the user the capability to customize/filter the visual representation 
of the scenario within the visualization tool.  The current level of 
abstraction is defined by the User’s decision for what events they 
want to see. 
 Architecture Modeling Versus Software/System Testing – The tool 
is meant to be used for software/system architecture and testing 
and is not meant to be used for system testing. 
 Abstraction Risks for Loss of Critical System Behavior – The 
concept of abstraction means that assumptions have to be made 




abstraction layer contains a risk of developing a model that does 
not include critical details of the system.  The MP construct allows 
for certain attributes to be modeled, but not all aspects for system 
behavior can be modeled at the abstract level. 
 Statistical Evaluation in Software Safety – The process of 
generating random scenarios and calculating probabilities for 
events implies uncertainty, which may be unacceptable for some 
software safety assessments. 
 IF and WHERE Constructs are not available – The current toolset 
does not allow for conditional evaluation during the scenario 
generation.  This concept is in design and is expected to be in a 
future release.  The WHEN handler is discussed in the ICCRTS 
2010 paper by Auguston/Whitcomb entitled "System Architecture 
Specification Based on Behavior Models,” in Proceedings of the 
15th ICCRTS Conference (International Command and Control 
Research and Technology Symposium), Santa Monica, CA, June 
22-24, 2010. 
 Dynamic Attributes – Attributes that require a dynamic state cannot 
be modeled within the current tool and is reserved for future work. 
 Finite vs. Infinite System Modeling – The current tool does not 
support modeling systems that do not have a finite execution. 
 Limitations of the Prototype SSSTRP Process – The proposed 
revised SSSTRP process introduces the results of this research 
into the current SSSTRP process while adding artifacts within each 
evaluation stage.  The proposed changes to the SSSTRP process 
have not been tested within the SSSTRP process; therefore the 
validity of the proposed process is unknown. 
 Risks of Jackson’s Small Scope Hypothesis – Determining 




dependent upon the situation and complexity of the model.  
Jackson’s Small Scope Hypothesis is incapable of being verified as 
the definition of “Small Scope” is not verifiable.  Future work is 
required to determine appropriate scope requirements for software 
safety assessments. 
 Risk Assessment Capability – The Eagle6 tool is not designed to 
evaluate risk, and to combine the probability of events and risk to 








V. RESEARCH CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The objective of the research was to identify the problems associated with 
the high number of SSSTRP failures.  The research included a review of three 
years of unclassified SSSTRP reports, and an analysis of the failures (Chapter 
II).  A prototype modeling methodology, and the ability to apply the modeling 
methodology to the software safety domain, was demonstrated in Chapter III. 
The initial Eagle6 prototype modeling methodology framework was tested 
using a case study of a naval gun weapon system, found in Appendix A.  The 
Eagle6 tool can generate executable code that can be evaluated using macro 
queries, which improves the current SSSTRP evaluation methodology found in 
Chapter II.  An ability to transfer simple, abstract modeling techniques into formal 
methods that are able to be tested was created.  The following is a summary of 
my research contribution relative to the improvements of the current SSSTRP 
process of evaluating potential gun weapon system architectural changes: 
Methodology and Tools to Support Software System Safety Analysis for 
the SSSTRP Evaluation Process - The Eagle6 tool gives the SSSTRP modeler 
the ability to model the interaction between the system and its environment, as 
demonstrated in Chapter III.  The ability to model environmental effects on 
software/systems enables the SSSTRP member to evaluate potential gun 
weapon system changes with higher fidelity compared to the current evaluation 
process. 
Higher Fidelity of SSSTRP Evaluation via Assertion Checking – The 
current SSSTRP evaluation methodology is random testing using inspection 
techniques, as identified Chapter II.  The Eagle6 tool enables the SSSTRP to 
create assertions about specific components and behaviors of a system, and 
gives them the tools to verify the assertions via formal queries. 
Two Modes of Scenario Generation – Our modeling tool enables the 




and Random scenario generation for statistical estimates of nonfunctional 
requirements, such as performance.  
Extension of Monterey Phoenix Modeling Methodology - Our research 
extended the MP framework by using predefines macro queries (concept of 
“Chain” and predefine aggregate operations over events). 
A. FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
Research opportunities have arisen within this project but have not been 
fully explored.  These issues are related to the SSSTRP process.  Suggested 
areas for future research include: 
 Business Process Reengineering–Eagle6 produces abstract views 
of systems; prototyping proposed BPR solutions could be 
researched. 
 Oracle/Black Box Testing--Eagle6 does not require the input of 
system specifics.  Future research opportunities exist to test system 
architectures that have black box components. 
 Refinement of the Model Compiler – The current compiler has 
hardware limitations that may be improved by improving the 
hardware processing capability, and the compiler software design.  
 Graphical User Interface for Model Abstraction – A graphical design 
tool that automatically generates model code could be developed.  
A visual interface that allows dynamic addition of systems (and 
subsystems), and connections between them, would improve the 
speed of development. 
 Development of a methodology that encompasses the evaluation of 
Dynamic Attribute Values - Evaluation of dynamic attribute values is 
necessary, since the events of a system often cause chain 




 Development of the SSSTRP Evaluation Process – This 
dissertation describes a suggested methodology for implementing 
our methodology into the SSSTRP Software evaluation process.  
Further research that is focused on the process and implementation 
of a formal method for evaluating software is needed. 
 Risk Assessment – Capturing the measured consequence of an 
event, and combining it with the probability of the event, should 
lead to some form of Risk Assessment. 
 Model Verification – An ability to verify the accuracy of an MP 
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APPENDIX A – MP MODEL FOR GUN WEAPON SYSTEM MK 34 MOD 1 
 
// the activity of AN/SPS–67 [R2D] – 2–D Surface Search Rotating Radar 
ROOT R2D_activity: {(* <1> R2D_displayNewTarget *)}; // R2D displays a new target on the screen 
 
// the activity of C&D [CD] – Command and Decision. 
ROOT CD_activity: {(* <1> CD_spotNewTarget *)}; // CD spots a new target on R2D screen 
 // CD waits for R2D to display a new target and then decides what to do with that target  
 CD_spotNewTarget: (R2D_displayNewTarget(CD_ignoreTarget | <0.8>  
 (CD_request_GCC_setTarget // CD requests GCC more information about the target 
 CD_wait_GCC_setTarget // CD waits for GCC to set target 
 ((GCC_targetNotSet // GCC fails to set target 
 CD_targetLost ) | <0.873> (GCC_targetSet // GCC sets the target and returns target info 
 CD_followTarget // CD follows target movements and waits to see what happens 
  (CD_abortTarget // CD aborts target, considers it unimportant  
   | <0.8> (CD_request_GCC_openFire CD_wait_GCC_openFire // CD waits for GCC to open fire  
  (GCC_openFireFailed // GCC failed to open fire 
   | <0.25249031177832> targetMissed  
   | <0.58914406084842> targetHit)))))))); 
 
// the activity of Gun Console Computer [GCC] – Sub–element of the GCS. 
ROOT GCC_activity: {(* <0–1/0.2,0.8> GCC_setTarget *) }; // GCC sets a target 
 GCC_setTarget: ( // GCC sets a target (waits for CD to request set Target and returns target information) 
 CD_request_GCC_setTarget // GCC waits CD to request to set target 
 (GCC_targetNotSet | <0.9> (GCC_request_R3D_setTarget // GCC requests R3D  more information about the target 
 GCC_wait_R3D_setTarget // GCC waits for R3D to set target    
 ((R3D_targetNotSet // R3D fails to work 
 GCC_targetNotSet) // GCC fails to work because of R3D 
 | <0.97> (R3D_targetSet // R3D sets the target and returns target info 
 GCC_targetSet))))); // GCC sets the target and returns target info 
 
// the activity of AN/SPY–1D [R3D] – 3–D Air Defense and Surface Search Phased Array Radar 
ROOT R3D_activity: {(* <0–1/0.28,0.72>R3D_setTarget*)}; 




R3D_setTarget: ( // R3D sets target on radar (it waits for GCC to request and returns additional information about target) 
GCC_request_R3D_setTarget // waits for GCC to request a set target operation 
(R3D_targetNotSet // R3D fails to set target 
 | <0.97> R3D_targetSet )); // R3D manages to set target 
 
ROOT GCC2_activity: {(* <0–1/0.44128,0.55872> GCC_openFire *) }; // GCC open fires on target 
 GCC_openFire: ( // GCC opens fire at target (waits for CD to request openFire and opens fire) 
 CD_request_GCC_openFire // GCC waits for CD to request to open fire 
 (GCC_openFireFailed // GCC is not working ok and it fails to open fire 
 | <0.98> (GCC_request_GMP_openFire // GCC requests GMP to open fire 
 GCC_wait_GMP_openFire // GCC waits for GMP to open fire 
 ((GMP_openFireFailed // GMP fails to open fire 
 GCC_openFireFailed) // GCC fails to open fire because of GMP 
  | <0.257643175284> targetMissed 
  | <0.601167409029> targetHit)))); 
 
// the activity of Gun Mount Processor AN/UYK–44 EP/OSM [GMP]  
ROOT GMP_activity: {(* <0–1/0.4524544,0.5475456>  
 GMP_answerRequest_GCC_openFire *)};// GMP answers request from GCC to open fire 
 GMP_answerRequest_GCC_openFire: ( // GMP answers request from GCC to open fire  
 GCC_request_GMP_openFire // GMP waits for GCC to request to open fire  
 (GMP_openFireFailed // GMP is not working ok and it fails to open fire 
  | <0.99> (GMCP_displayOpenFireRequest // display on GMCP screen a fire request 
  ((GMCP_openFireFailed // GMCP fails to open fire 
  GMP_openFireFailed // GMP fails to open fire because of GMCP 
  )| <0.6072398071> targetHit | <0.2602456316> targetMissed )))); 
 
// the activity of Gun Mount Control Panel MK 437 Mod 1 [GMCP] – Backup Operator's console installed below the gun mount.  
ROOT GMCP_activity: {(* <0–1/0.457929856,0.542070144> GMCP_answerFireRequest *)}; // GMCP answers a fire request when 
displayed on screen 
GMCP_answerFireRequest: ( // GMCP answers a fire request  
 GMCP_displayOpenFireRequest // GMCP displays an open fire request on screen 
 (GMCP_openFireFailed // GMCP fails to open fire 




 GMCP_wait_GMP_ossData // GMCP waits for optical sight system data from GMP 
 ((GMCP_failReceiving_GMP_ossData // GMCP doesn't receive oss target data from GMP 
 GMCP_openFireFailed )// GMCP fails to open fire 
 | <0.9223662294> (GMCP_receive_GMP_ossData // GMCP receives optical sight system data 
 (GMCP_send_GM_openFireCommand // GMCP sends GM an open fire command 
 GMCP_wait_GM_openFireCommand // GMCP waits for GM to open fire 
 ((GM_openFireFailed // GM fails to open fire 
 GMCP_openFireFailed) // GMCP fails to open fire because of GM 
  | <0.665> targetHit // target is hit 
  | <0.285> targetMissed )))))));// target is missed 
 
ROOT GMP2_activity: {(* <0–1/0.46335055744,0.53664944256>  
 GMP_answerRequest_GMCP_ossData *)}; // GMP answers a request from GMCP for optical sight target data 
 GMP_answerRequest_GMCP_ossData: ( // GMP answers a request of oss data from GMCP  
 GMCP_request_GMP_ossData // GMP waits for GMCP to request ossData 
 (GMCP_failReceiving_GMP_ossData // GMCP doesn't receive oss data because GMP fails to work 
  | <0.95> (GMP_request_CDC_ossData // GMP requests CDC oss data 
  GMP_wait_CDC_ossData // GMP waits for CDC oss data     
  ((GMP_failReceiving_CDC_ossData // GMP doesn't receive oss data from CDC 
  GMCP_failReceiving_GMP_ossData) // GMCP doesn't receive oss data because of CDC 
   | <0.95089302> (GMP_receive_CDC_ossData // GMP receives oss data from CDC 
   GMCP_receive_GMP_ossData ))))); // GMCP receives oss data from GMP 
 
// the activity of Optical Sight System MK 46 Mod 1 – Control Display Console MK 132 Mod 0 [CDC]  
ROOT CDC_activity: {(* <0–1/0.490183029568,0.509816970432> 
 CDC_answerRequest_GMP_ossData*)};  // CDC answers the request from GMP of oss data 
 CDC_answerRequest_GMP_ossData: ( // CDC answers the request from GMP of oss data  
 GMP_request_CDC_ossData // CDC waits for GMP to request ossData 
 (GMP_failReceiving_CDC_ossData // CDC is not working ok, GMP doesn't receive oss data 
 | <0.99> (CDC_request_EOD_ossData // CDC request EOD oss data (thermal and daylight) 
 CDC_wait_EOD_ossData // CDC waits for ossData from EOD 
 ((CDC_failReceiving_EOD_ossData // CDC doesn't receive oss data from EOD 
 GMP_failReceiving_CDC_ossData )// GMP doesn't receive oss data because of EOD 




 GMP_receive_CDC_ossData ))))); // GMP receives oss data from CDC 
 
// the activity of Optical Sight System MK 46 Mod 1 – Electro–Optic Director MK 85 Mod 1 [EOD]  
ROOT EOD_activity: {(* <0–1/0.49528119927232,0.50471880072768> 
 EOD_answerRequest_CDC_ossData *)};// EOD answers the request from CDC of oss data 
 EOD_answerRequest_CDC_ossData: ( // EOD answers the request from CDC of oss data  
 CDC_request_EOD_ossData // EOD waits for CDC to request optical sight system data 
 (CDC_failReceiving_EOD_ossData // EOD is not working, CDC doesn't receive EOD data 
 | <0.98> (EOD_requestDaylightSensorData // EOD requests data from daylight sensor 
  ((EOD_failGettingDaylightSensorData // EOD fails getting data from daylight sensor 
  CDC_failReceiving_EOD_ossData) // CDC doesn't receive EOD data because of the daylight sensor 
  | <0.99> (EOD_receiveDaylightSensorData // EOD receives data from daylight sensor 
  EOD_requestThermalSensorData // EOD requests data from thermal sensor 
  ((EOD_failGettingThermalSensorData //EOD fails getting data from thermal sensor 
  CDC_failReceiving_EOD_ossData) //CDC doesn’t receive EOD data because of the thermal sensor 
  | <0.99> (EOD_receiveThermalSensorData // EOD receives data from thermal sensor 
  CDC_receive_EOD_ossData ))))))); // CDC receives oss data from EOD (daylight, thermal) 
 
// the activity of Gun Mount EX 45 Mod 4 [GM] – The 5” gun mount 
ROOT GM_activity: {(* <0–1/0.505012677156320916736,0.494987322843679083264> 
GM_answer_GMCP_openFireCommand *)}; // waits for GMCP to send an open fire command and it opens fire 
GM_answer_GMCP_openFireCommand: ( // waits for GMCP to send an open fire command and it opens fire 
GMCP_send_GM_openFireCommand // waits for GMCP to send an open fire command 
 (GM_openFireFailed // GM fails to open fire 
  | <0.95> (GM_launchMissile // GM launches a missile 
  GM_waitForMissileToHit // GM waits for the missile to hit the enemy target 
  (targetHit // target is hit 
  | <0.3> targetMissed ))));// target is missed 
 
R2D_displayNewTarget: <Max_Watts=90, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.5, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
 





CD_wait_GCC_setTarget: <Max_Watts=10, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.1, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
 
GCC_request_R3D_setTarget: <Max_Watts=100, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
GCC_wait_R3D_setTarget: <Max_Watts=8, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.1, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
 
R3D_targetSet: <Max_Watts=120, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=2.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
 
GCC_targetSet: <Max_Watts=120, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=2.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
 
CD_followTarget: <Max_Watts=160, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=4.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=0.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1> ; 
 
CD_request_GCC_openFire: <Max_Watts=60, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=0.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=2>; 
CD_wait_GCC_openFire: <Max_Watts=5, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.2, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=2>; 
 
GCC_request_GMP_openFire: <Max_Watts=60, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=0.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=2>; 
GCC_wait_GMP_openFire: <Max_Watts=5, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.3, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=2>; 
 
GMCP_displayOpenFireRequest: <Max_Watts=140, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=0>; 
 
GMCP_request_GMP_ossData: <Max_Watts=100, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.5, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=2.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
 
GMP_request_CDC_ossData: <Max_Watts=100, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 





CDC_request_EOD_ossData: <Max_Watts=110, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
CDC_wait_EOD_ossData: <Max_Watts=100, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
 
EOD_requestDaylightSensorData: <Max_Watts=80, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
 
EOD_receiveDaylightSensorData: <Max_Watts=120, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=3.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=2.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
 
EOD_requestThermalSensorData: <Max_Watts=80, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
 
EOD_receiveThermalSensorData: <Max_Watts=120, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=3.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=2.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
 
CDC_receive_EOD_ossData: <Max_Watts=150, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=3.5, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=3.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
 
GMP_receive_CDC_ossData: <Max_Watts=120, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.5, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=2.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
 
GMCP_receive_GMP_ossData: <Max_Watts=120, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=2.5, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
GMCP_wait_GMP_ossData: <Max_Watts=10, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.5, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=1>; 
 
GMCP_send_GM_openFireCommand: <Max_Watts=100, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=1.0, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=1.0, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=2> ; 
GMCP_wait_GM_openFireCommand: <Max_Watts=10, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.5, Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=2>; 
 






GM_waitForMissileToHit: <Max_Watts=50, Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB=0.5, Total_Processing_Time_Sec=0.5, 
Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd=0> ; 
 
R2D_activity, CD_activity SHARE ALL R2D_displayNewTarget; 
GCC_activity, CD_activity SHARE ALL CD_request_GCC_setTarget, GCC_targetNotSet, GCC_targetSet; 
R3D_activity, GCC_activity SHARE ALL GCC_request_R3D_setTarget, R3D_targetNotSet, R3D_targetSet; 
GCC2_activity, CD_activity SHARE ALL CD_request_GCC_openFire, GCC_openFireFailed, targetMissed, targetHit; 
GMP_activity, GCC_activity SHARE ALL GCC_request_GMP_openFire, GMP_openFireFailed, targetMissed, targetHit; 
GMCP_activity, GMP_activity SHARE ALL GMCP_displayOpenFireRequest, GMCP_openFireFailed, targetMissed, targetHit; 
GMP2_activity, GMCP_activity SHARE ALL GMCP_request_GMP_ossData, GMCP_failReceiving_GMP_ossData, 
GMCP_receive_GMP_ossData; 
CDC_activity, GMP_activity SHARE ALL GMP_request_CDC_ossData, GMP_failReceiving_CDC_ossData, 
GMP_receive_CDC_ossData; 
EOD_activity, CDC_activity SHARE ALL CDC_request_EOD_ossData, CDC_failReceiving_EOD_ossData, 
CDC_receive_EOD_ossData; 











APPENDIX B – GUN WEAPON SYSTEM MK 34 MOD 1 ASSERTION LIBRARY 
Assertion Description Assertion 
Find a scenario where the 
system’s max watts 
requirement exceeds the 
gun weapon system’s 
watts capacity. 
ASSERTION GWSMaxWatts: SliceSum(Max_Watts, >=, 220) 
Find a possible hazard 
state scenario where the 
Gun Console Computer 
(GCC) Open Fire 
command fails. 
ASSERTION GCC_OpenFireFail: EventCount(GCC_openFireFailed, >=, 1);   
 
Find a scenario where 
parallel events may 
require a total network 
bandwidth throughput that 
is greater than the gun 
weapon system network 
capacity. 
ASSERTION Network_Capacity_Check: SliceSum(Network_Bandwidth_Req_MB, >=, 5);   
Show any sequence of 
events that may cause the 
GCC_OpenFire command 
to require more than three 
manual approvals. 
ASSERTION Max_Manual_Approvals: {(EventCount(GCC_openFire, >=, 
1))(ChainSum(Req_Num_Man_Approv_For_Cmd, >=, 3))}; 
 
Find a scenario where the 
total amount of time to 
execute a GCC_openFire 
command is greater than 
ASSERTION GCC_Timeout: {(EventCount(GCC_openFire, >=, 




five  seconds. 
  
ASSERTION Construct: 
ASSERTION AssertionName: EventCount (EventName, Operator, Value)); 
ASSERTION AssertionName: SliceSum (AttributeName, Operator, Value); 
ASSERTION AssertionName: ChainSum (AttributeName, Operator, Value); 
ASSERTION AssertionName: Probability (Operator, Value); 





APPENDIX C – DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
The following are the definitions of specific terms used in this document:   
 
Computer Software (or software) – A combination of associated computer 
instructions and computer data definitions required to enable the computer 
hardware to perform computational or control functions.   
 
Explosive System – An explosive system is a type of ordnance installed on Navy 
ships or aircraft which do not have non–weapon functions.  It includes all the 
hardware and software required for its operation and support through its life 
cycle.  A countermeasure system, an ejection seat, and a cable cutter are 
examples of explosive systems.   
 
Explosives – The term “explosive” or “explosives” includes any chemical, 
compound, or mechanical mixture which, when subjected to heat, impact, friction, 
detonation, or other suitable initiation, undergoes a very rapid chemical change 
with the evolution of large volumes of highly heated gases, which exert pressures 
in the surrounding medium.  The term applies to high explosives, propellants, 
and pyrotechnics that detonate, deflagrate, burn vigorously, or generate heat, 
light, smoke, or sound.   
 
Explosives Safety – Explosives safety is the process used to prevent premature, 
unintentional, or unauthorized initiation of explosives and devices containing 
explosives, and to minimize the effects of explosions, combustion, toxicity, and 
any other deleterious characteristics.  Explosives safety includes all mechanical, 
chemical, biological, electrical, and environmental hazards associated with 
explosives; hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance; and combinations 
therein.  Equipment, systems, or procedures and processes whose malfunction 
would hazard the safe manufacturing, handling, maintenance, storage, transfer, 
release, testing, delivery, firing, or disposal of explosives are also included.   
 
Firmware – The combination of a hardware device and computer instructions or 
computer data that reside as read–only software on the hardware device.  The 
software cannot be readily modified under program control.  For purposes of this 
instruction, firmware and software are considered synonymous.   
 
Non–Developmental Item (NDI) – NDI covers material available with little or no 
government development effort required and includes items from domestic or 
foreign commercial sources (off–the–shelf), items already developed by other 
services, defense activities and government agencies, and items developed by 
foreign governments.  NDIs may be a system, subsystem, or component, 
including software.   
 
Ordnance – Military material such as combat weapons of all kinds, with 




things that make up a ship’s or aircraft’s armament including guns, ammunition, 
and all equipment and ordnance–related software needed to control, operate, 
and support the weapons.   
 
Principal for Safety – The Principal for Safety is the Program Office’s point of 
contact for safety–related matters.  The Principal for Safety shall have the 
authority to speak for the Program Office on safety–related matters and shall be 
the primary liaison with the WSESRB.   
 
Program Managers – Program Managers are those acquisition/life cycle 
managers assigned the responsibility and delegated the authority for the 
acquisition and life cycle management of a particular system.  In this instruction, 
the term “Program Manager (PM)” includes DoN acquisition managers and all 
others covered by the Navy Explosives Safety Program of reference (a).  PM is 
used in this instruction for program, product, or project manager; Direct Reporting 
Program Manager (DRPM); or Program Executive Officer (PEO), as well as for 
other weapons acquisition officials.   
 
Weapon System – A weapon system is a type of ordnance intended for use in 
defeating enemy targets.  A weapon system includes hardware and software 
subsystems and components required for its operation and support throughout its 
life cycle, including that necessary for the selection, arming, release or firing, and 
jettison of an ordnance item.  The weapon system, as defined herein, includes its 
interface with the delivery platform.  For the purpose of this instruction, an 
“approved weapon system” is one whose configuration has previously been 
before the WSESRB and all safety recommendations/issues made by the board 
have either been incorporated in the system or resolved.   
 
Weapon System Safety – Weapon system safety is the aggregate of analytical 
and testing processes, procedures, training, and management policy used to 
ensure that the risks associated with weapons and related systems are reduced 
to the lowest extent practical throughout the system’s life cycle.   
 
Weapon System Explosives Safety Review Board – The WSESRB is designated 
by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) as the DON’s authority for the review 
and independent assessment of the safety aspects of weapon systems, 
explosive systems, and related systems, and is empowered to make safety 
recommendations to the responsible Navy Command, PM, and Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA).  With regard to the conduct of test firings aboard Navy 
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